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

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THINGS THAT REMAIN

The Bolen Lectures, 1928

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BY

CARL E. GRAMMER

RECTOR, ST. STEPHEN'S CHURCH, PHILADELPHIA
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DEDICATED TO

MY CONGREGATIONS IN ST. STEPHEN'S CHURCH,

PHILADELPHIA, AND IN CHRIST CHURCH, NORFOLK

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

EVERYONE will admit that we live in an age of reconstruction, when foundations are being tested. Not only have we new sciences like psychology, but the old sciences have entered upon a new stage, and we have a new physics, and a new chemistry. New methods have entered even into primary instruction, and we have new methods of teaching reading and writing, new mathematics and new geography. The thorough reconstruction of medicine since the discoveries of Pasteur is a matter of common knowledge. Even the conservative law has adopted new methods in the law school, and seeks in the courts to modify the rigor of its deductive logic by new insights into the needs of society and new judgments of value.

It is so generally believed that theology is an exceedingly backward science, if it be entitled to that name, that it will surprise many people to hear that theology has shown itself far more

responsive than the kindred study of the law to the changes in science and philosophy. Yet I believe that this has always been the case. Certainly in America the new theology appeared before either the new law or the new medicine. Old School and New School antedated the Darwinian theory. The extent of this theological reconstruction, however, became apparent only with the victory of the higher criticism of the Bible.

To-day it is manifest that we are in the midst of a second Reformation, the complement of the first. Then the watchword of the Reformers was a return to the written word. The most important of all the Thirty-nine Articles is the sixth; it is indeed worth all the rest, and is the premise from which the Reformers thought all the rest could be deduced. "Holy Scripture containeth all things necessary to salvation; so that whatsoever is not read therein, nor may be proved thereby is not to be required of any man that it should be believed as an article of the Faith, or be thought requisite or necessary to salvation."

To-day, however, it is requisite and necessary that Biblical teachings be justified at the bar of reason. The traditions of the Synagogue, which so long shaped our theory of inspiration, have followed the traditions of the Church into the lumber room. We realize that the books of the Bible

contain the record of progressive insight into the nature of God, and their teachings must be winnowed and sifted by a reason educated to new sensitiveness by the study of the mind of Christ, and equipped with new instruments of investigation, and a larger knowledge of the universe. We can believe nothing that reason definitely rejects. Men are asking for a reasonable faith. Subjected to the test of reason, many of the old dogmas derived from the Bible, understood literally, have been as thoroughly discredited as the medieval dogmas, that were based upon the authority of the Church. Both the Infallible Book and the Infallible Church have been rejected, and the questions ought to be frankly asked, How much of the old faith is left? Will enough of religion survive these analytical processes to be entitled to the name of Christianity, and to be of any value for life?

To these questions many conservatively minded people answer with a decided negative. They hold that this so-called reconstruction is in reality a process of destruction, and that skepticism and not faith seeking for a philosophy is the moving spirit of the whole procedure. Like Newman they believe that the unrestrained activity of wild restless intellect will eventually destroy faith. They therefore take their stand on the authority of the Church and of the Book and the manifest bless-

ings of Christianity, which they rightly hold cannot if the universe is moral, be the fruit of falsehood or delusion. "Let us," they counsel, "anchor in this good roadstead, and let this storm blow itself out." "It will pass," as Athanasius remarked of Arianism.

The same view of the process is taken by the radicals. They, too, hold that what we call reconstruction is really decay and decomposition. They do not, however, regret this result. They welcome it as indicating the end of superstition. In their eyes religion has become as incredible as astrology, and with a sense of relief they set about framing systems of ethics that know nothing of God and exult in the hope that Ethical Societies will supersede the Church. Others go further, and claim that not only religion but philosophy also will finally be discredited. The Gingham Dog and the Calico Cat ate each other up according to Eugene Field's nursery poem, but Reason will surpass this marvel and will devour itself, according to these radicals. These preposterous conclusions are to my mind sufficient indications that both these extremes, the Conservatives and the Radicals, have misjudged the situation. What they take for processes of decay, I hold to be fermentation, the growth of new life upon the old. This mighty wind, which the ultra Conservative thinks will blow itself out, which the Radical believes

will certainly wreck the barque of religion on the rocky shores of science, I regard as a steady trade wind, that can be trusted to carry us to safe harbors and a fruitful land. All that is needed is to hold the helm steady, and to guide our course by the fixed stars. Like St. Paul's ship off the coast of Malta, all will be well, if the crew abide in the ship, and, I may add, work the ship. For this wind blows not in the circumambient air, but in that inner and cosmic region called mind, affects not things, or instruments, but persons and agents, calls for responses and reactions, and lays upon us tasks and duties. The special task that I have taken upon myself here is to point out some of the truths of Christianity which show no signs of decomposition under modern analysis, with its larger knowledge, its new points of view and new methods.

These basic truths, modern methods are as powerless to destroy as the waves of the sea to wash out the stars, for they are grounded in the constitution of our nature, and revelation has only acted, like fire on invisible ink, to bring them out. He who tries to pull them up will find, like Thor when he sought to lift up the Midgard serpent which encircled the world, that the whole nature of things resists his efforts. They are the things that cannot be shaken and remain after the removing of those things that can be shaken.

Not only are they incontrovertible, they are also sufficient to supply a helpful guide for life, and preserve enough of the old values to be entitled to be called Christianity. Of course this is only another way of saying that Christianity is reasonable.

The claim is often made. Can it be justified? Certainly it cannot be left as a mere assertion. Those who claim that the processes of change are ultimately constructive are called on to justify their theory and give their reasons for this cheerful optimism. As I have indicated, the success of the process calls for the coöperation of many agents. Religious people have no right to stand aside and await the result. We cannot safely leave the handling of the problem to those who lack spiritual insight or religious experience.

It is this common responsibility that is my justification for calling your attention to the problem and asking you to consider with me the proper solution. As Rothe well said, Religion has more than the two points of God and man; like a circle it is determined by three points, and the third point is humanity. We are social beings, and we stand in social relations. Our problems as human beings call for the coöperation of our fellowmen. The problems of religion, like the problems of government, demand that the thoughts of many hearts be revealed. We cannot leave these ques-

tions to experts. They must be considered from every possible point of view, the more diverse the better.

It is for this reason that I do not feel that I am disqualified by my engrossment for years in the duties of the parochial ministry. A professor in philosophy or theology has undoubtedly special equipment and special insight, but so has the rector of a church. Most people come to these problems of belief, not along the paths of the specialist in philosophy or theology, but as the result of an effort to harmonize their religious life with the processes of thought that they have learned to trust in their secular life.

Professor Gildersleeve used to tell his pupils that his interest in the niceties of syntax came from his love of literature, and not the reverse. Surely that is the right order: first, the relish; then, the analysis; then, the heightened and more intelligent pleasure. That is the road most people travel in religion: they first come under the power of its teachings; then they seek to understand more thoroughly the teachings that have moved them. The great trouble with professors is that they so often endeavor to make the philosophy create the experience, instead of appreciating that the proper subject of philosophy is the experience itself.

In my own life I took the usual, and, I believe,

the proper road. I began my life with a sincere belief in Christianity, as taught by the Evangelical school in the Protestant Episcopal Church. The vitality of this religion was evident to me in the lives of the members of the great Evangelical congregation of St. Peter's Church, Baltimore, of which my father was the rector, and in our family life. It was incredible to me that there should not be a substantial basis for such a beneficent and fruitful faith. It made, however, demands that I was not willing to obey, and my faith was a mere speculative assent, till I took up the study of the Bible for myself.

This came to pass when I was a student of law. While reading the eighth chapter of the Epistle to the Romans, there came to me a conviction that God's spirit must be drawing me, and working in me these new and profound interests. My response was that if God wanted me, I certainly wanted God. I knelt down, and yielded myself to the Sovereign Will of the Universe. A new happiness and strength came at once into my life; I was confirmed, and after a summer of deliberation, gave up my legal studies and entered the theological seminary. I believed, as Silas Marner put it, that there had been "dealings" with me. The critical question soon rose, whether this mystical experience should determine the ultimate form of my theology. Much of the

strength and peace that religion had brought me, undoubtedly came from my acceptance of the Determinism of St. Paul; believing that God had elected me to life and service, I felt that I could not fail of victory. The moral difficulties of Determinism, and the fate of the wicked did not trouble me, for I soon discovered that the Biblical support of the doctrine of Eternal punishment was slight. It seemed reasonable that the will of God must ultimately prevail with the individual as well as with the universe. Conditional immortality was unthinkable; our Heavenly Father, all-powerful and all-loving, could not be bereaved of a child. I accepted the teachings of Farrar's *Eternal Hope.* Later on, under the teaching of that sound theologian, Dr. Cornelius Walker, and through the reading of Channing's moral argument against Calvinism, I gave up Determinism, and accepted the Freedom of the Will as essential to personality and moral accountability. This new philosophy of man did not, however, lead me to abandon my hope of the ultimate victory of the Divine Will. God would still prevail, not by the power of irresistible decrees, but by the power of one personality over another. He would draw men to him with the cords of a man, as the old divines used to put it, and not as the iron magnet attracts its filings. Thus, you observe, I held my conclusion had been valid, although I could no

longer travel the road by which I had reached it. In the same way I clung to my belief that God had drawn me to Him, when I was reading Romans, although I gave up the Deterministic philosophy that had so greatly helped me to yield to that drawing.

A larger philosophy, that embraced more of the truths of life, had supplanted my first theory, but I did not therefore conclude that the first theory was entirely false, and contained no element of truth. Indeed, it seemed to me that the truths that it emphasized were just the truths that I had needed at that crisis in my life.

This early experience of the saving truths in Calvinism, I may say in passing, has prevented me from sharing in the general aversion to Puritanism. I look on it as the rock whence I was hewn, and reverence its great affirmations of the sovereignty of God, the organic oneness of mankind, and its emphasis on God's part in our salvation. If Calvinism failed to appreciate human accountability, Arminianism did not sufficiently exalt Divine Grace, nor realize sufficiently the immanence of God. Rightly looked at, each supplemented the other.

I do not dwell on these theories for their theological content, though it is sheer ignorance of philosophy to consider the controversy as dead. The debate between Free Will and Determinism

is always with us; Science ever seeking to prove Determinism, and Ethics with equal tenacity holding to a Will, that if limited in its action, is, nevertheless, within these limits free. Lotze tells us that a philosophical theory is an attempt to justify "a fundamental view of things which has been adopted early in life." In these changes I was guided by a fundamental view that has continued with me through life: namely, that the mystical experience did not authenticate the whole of the philosophy held at the time, and that a new philosophy did not prove that there were no elements of truth in the old philosophy, nor invalidate the mystical experience that the old philosophy had a share in creating.

Without these convictions I should indeed have been in an evil case; for the process of theological reconstruction went on steadily, especially after I became a Professor in the Theological Seminary near Alexandria, Virginia. I cannot claim that I was a profound student of the new theology. My tasks as a teacher of Church History made such reading impossible. I had to be content with a general knowledge of the new views. But such knowledge seemed to me sufficient. The great words of St. Paul ever rang in my ears that "the word is nigh thee, even in thine heart." The command of Jesus to call no man master charged me with a personal responsibility for my faith.

If Christianity was true, we were in the dispensation of the Spirit, and were living in the days when the promise ran that "I will put my law in their inward parts and write it on their hearts." A convinced Protestant, I would as soon have depended on the Pope or the Church Councils for my faith, as on the last utterances of the specialists in theology or philosophy. No man could be required by the God of Truth to believe anything that did not commend itself to his reason.

So I set about the examination of the body of Christian Doctrine for myself. The new views were in the air, and were being blown in at every window. The teaching of my classes kept me in touch with fundamental problems and the original records. I tested the new theories for myself on the books of the Bible, and discovered that the popular theory of inspiration is not drawn from the Bible, was not held by the great Reformers, and was the outgrowth of controversial zeal.

With the false light of this theory withdrawn, I was able to see the books of the Bible as they are, and soon proved satisfactorily to myself the main positions of the higher criticism of the Old Testament. Earlier still was my conviction that the constitution and official doctrinal statements of the Church were growths in which many elements were combined with the original impulse and teaching. Since my conclusions were in

accord with the teachings of modern scholarship, I was confirmed in my belief that technical learning is not necessary for sound conclusions on these subjects. While I retained my tenderness for the Evangelicals, and my unity of the spirit with them in their emphasis on personal religion, I became a Broad Churchman or Liberal, or a Modernist, as they put it in England, though I dislike the term because of its association with the Roman Catholic Modernists, whose rejection of the historical element in Christianity seems to me too radical and unbalanced.

This theological journey was so common among the college-trained clergymen of the Evangelical school of my date, that it would not be worth recounting here, if it were not that this personal experience supplies the basis of the argument of these lectures. It will be noticed that I began with a firm belief in the essential truths of Christianity; that subsequently Christianity awoke a mystic response, and that then, having a personal experience of its power, I reduced it to a form acceptable to my reason. Later on, when I took a parish, I added another test which also became an instrument of reconstruction, by trying to awake a response to my message in the hearts and minds of my hearers. Conceiving that the main object of my ministry was neither to expound a literature nor to build up an institution, but to

help the members of my congregation to solve the problems of their lives by bringing them into touch with God through eternal truths, and by illuminating for them the path of duty, I took the truths that had helped me, and that I held as true, not on the authority of the Church or of the Book, but by reason of their appeal to my own reason, and sought to bring them home to my hearers. When the desired response was awakened, I need not say that my own faith was fortified. This is the road whereby I have reached the conclusions of these lectures.

Around these two foci, Christianity and Reason, all my thought and teaching have revolved, and I have reached definite conclusions. One is that it is the wise course to begin with the acceptance of the traditions and standards bequeathed to us by the past, as a provisional guide of life. The radical who proposes to begin his search for truth by denying everything until it has been proved, is like a scholar who should require a demonstration of the beauty of literature before reading the poets. If science is justified in its fundamental assumption that the universe is comprehensible by reason, surely theology is equally justified in its assumption that religion, which has such an important function in the life of the most rational part of nature that we know of, must have a rational basis.

Our first and soundest instinct is to believe. Psychology has taught us that this is the method of the child. It accepts instinctively the teachings of its elders. Through this attitude it gains possession of the elements of knowledge. Its mental life is largely occupied in absorbing knowledge provisionally, then verifying or modifying and enlarging it by its personal experience.

Such provisional acceptance must be clearly distinguished from the exaltation of the Church as the final authority, to whose decision as the Divinely appointed guide of the race we must submit our judgment as a lawyer submits his opinion of the meaning of the law to the Supreme Court of the United States. Not even to the original Twelve would St. Paul grant that kind of authority over his faith. Such subjection of reason is all right for the State, but ethically it is immoral, and religiously it is destructive of the freedom of the child of God, and of the supremacy of the Spirit. The individual reason must be the final authority of the individual.

It does not follow, however, that there is no place for a *provisional* authority. The child needs the guidance of the parent, and the Christian needs the teaching of the Church. Neither Church nor parent is an infallible or final authority. It is simply the best guide available, a provisional authority, whose teachings are to be accepted and

tried out. The Liberals are out of touch with the realities of life when they keep on proclaiming incessantly the barren proposition that the Church ought to provide freedom for its members, and especially for its teachers, and fail to point out the guiding function the Church is to perform. A church is something more than a platform for free discussion. It must do something more than stimulate inquiry; it must also provide a working hypothesis. Now that we appreciate the true nature of that great library, the Bible, no one can claim that it is sufficient to place that great literature in the hands of our pupils, with the assurance that it is inspired. Catechisms are a practical necessity. The child has a right to a compendious statement that will unify his experience, supply him with a rationale of the universe, and set before him a program of moral endeavor. The great questions of Whence and Whither press on him for a solution, and require some answer. He must have some answer, some sort of working hypothesis in this realm, as well as in others. The necessary prerequisite to thinking as a man is first thinking as a child. Not by giving up all thought as a child because of one's childishness does one attain sound thinking as a man. Let us not tell the children simply to follow Jesus; they want to know about the origin of the world, about the Fatherhood of God, about forgiveness

and Divine Help, about the Kingdom of God and the Hereafter. One of the great causes of the lack of progress of Protestantism is its failure to keep up this catechetical instruction. The difficulty is that the official catechisms retain so many theories that are no longer credible; e.g., the story of the Garden of Eden, baptismal regeneration, eternal punishment, the magical efficacy of the Lord's Supper, the Divine authority of one form of Church polity, etc. Moreover, the catechism has been presented as ultimate truth binding on the teacher and scholar, instead of being taught as the mind of the Church, with which only the most general agreement is necessary, a provisional theory to be verified, or modified, by future thought and experience.

This simplified catechism is one of the greatest needs of the Church, a catechism that is in accord with present knowledge, and is not presented as infallible, or ultimate, but as a provisional guide. Later on, I shall indicate some of the truths that I think ought to be included in this manual, truths that have survived all the revolutions of theology, and give promise of permanence.

But I must not overlook the Mystic's objection. This method of provisional authority and subsequent modification is all very well for human science, and earthly knowledge, the Mystic says, but is not in accord with the Divine method in

spiritual things, where the heavenly wisdom comes as a mystical experience, of which thou canst not tell whence it cometh or whither it goeth. *Non complicuit Deo in dialectica salvum facere hominem.* As well might we expect to prove by argument that Handel's *Messiah* is thrilling, that Wordsworth's poem on Tintern Abbey is poetical, or Cologne Cathedral is awe-inspiring, as to prove the truths of religion. Why not admit at once that logic plays an insignificant part in the propagation of religion? Has not the experience of the pulpit proven that appeals to the emotions are far more powerful than arguments? Let us then present Christianity in all its beauty and with all its rich appeal to the emotions and desires, its satisfaction for human nature's "demands," and let logic learn that its place is to wait upon the mystic experience, according to the great saying of Anselm, *"Credo ut intelligam."*

Far be it from me to minimize the value of the mystic experience. But it is certainly a mistake to isolate it in this fashion. Why not combine mysticism and reasoning? We must learn to read before the poets can thrill us. In appealing to the generosity of a congregation, a minister seeks to touch both the emotions and the reason. He appreciates that the influence of the emotions will be transient unless their appeal is ratified by the

reason, and that the reason will be impotent unless its verdict is energized by the emotions.

The same holds true of a living belief. One of the causes of the present controversy between the Fundamentalist and the Modernist is the insistence of the Fundamentalists that the mystic experience which the Fundamentalist theology has undoubtedly awakened in many breasts authenticates that theology in all its features and for all time. This contention is conclusively disproven by the fact that such contradictory kinds of theology have been held by the subjects of the mystic experience. Neither can we overlook the fact that there are such things as hallucinations and delusions. What M. Lapie, the Rector of the University of Paris, said of intuition, at the Sixth International Conference of Philosophy, holds true of the mystical experience. *"Si l'intuition conserve sa place à côté du raisonnement, dans la découverte de la vérité c'est à la condition d'être une intuition vérifiable et, par suite, raisonnable et rationelle."* Mysticism does stand alone. It has an important function, but it cannot supply the provisional hypothesis that awakes it, as for example the preacher's message that arouses the sinner, nor can it control the ultimate form in which the faith shall express itself. As the Catholic is wrong in regarding the Church's provisional statement as final and infallible, so the

Mystic misplaces and overemphasizes his mystic experience. It presupposes some knowledge, as well as supplies a basis for further knowledge. It cannot stand alone. The power of Christianity has always been the variety of its appeals, and the fullness with which it has met the demands of all departments of man's composite nature, satisfying his volitional nature by its program of the Kingdom, his emotional nature by the beauty of its morality, the grandeur of its doctrines, the sublimity of its worship, and his reason by the unity and intelligibility that it gave to the universe. It is a mistake to abandon any one of these fields. Social service and political reforms cannot be sidetracked in the interests of devotion or of theology. But neither can social service be allowed to occupy the whole field.

Inferior in appeal in my judgment to the demand for social righteousness is the demand of the æsthetic faculties that religion should supply them with gratification. Of course they have a right to be heard. People are justified in claiming that truth ought to be linked with beauty. Every preacher knows that argument without rhetoric makes but a limited appeal. The beauty of fine diction ought undoubtedly to be reënforced and supplemented by beauty of architecture and music and ceremonial. There is a mystical element here worth preserving. They are right who

claim that Protestantism needs to make a closer alliance with the arts.

It is, however, important to observe proportion in valuations. Those who think that the æsthetic appeal of religion may be made to serve as a bridge to conduct us safely over this transition era certainly mistake its relation to the other factors in belief. Æsthetic response is not an anchor that will hold. The support of reason is absolutely necessary. When reason rejected the religion of Greece, the æsthetic appeal of the calm beauty of the Parthenon, "forever finished in this hasty world," and the matchless poetry of Homer, Æschylus and Sophocles could not keep it alive. If mystical charm and æsthetic beauty are sufficient, how is it that medieval Catholicity which enshrined itself in the poetry of Dante, in Gothic architecture, in the majestic ceremonial and music of the mass, and awoke such rapturous response in many mystical souls, lost the allegiance of the most energetic nations of Europe? There will always be one-sidedly æsthetic people to whom the voice of beauty will be authoritative; people like Keats, who thought it an impertinence to ask whether the beautiful be true; like Burne-Jones, who when asked whether he believed in the historical truth of the Christian stories that he illustrated with such genius, answered that they were too beautiful not to be true. But with normal

people it is axiomatic that the true and the beautiful are not always one and the same. We realize that truth may be harshly and unbeautifully expressed, and that beautiful things may be regular Lamias to delude and betray, as passion disguised itself as a glorious revolt against tyranny in the person of Byron, and as ambition robed itself in splendor through the genius of Napoleon, on whose brow the youthful Heine saw written, "Thou shalt have none other gods but me."

Beauty is the soul of art, but truth and righteousness are the main interests of religion. In their quest, the early Christians had to turn their backs on the historic glories of the Temple worship, if they were Jews, and on the artistic splendors of the Pagan temples if they were Gentiles. Certainly Christianity did not make its way in the heroic ages, when it was a persecuted religion, by its æsthetic appeal. I venture this assertion in spite of Pater's *Marius the Epicurean,* and of Chateaubriand's *Génie du Christianisme.* Such thinkers as Clement, Origen, and Tertullian appealed successfully in these centuries of Christianity to the reason of mankind. The same appeal must be made to-day. It is folly to imagine that by the bridge of æstheticism the Church can be carried into the new era. With the great majority of people beauty and romance are usually the daughters of time, and gather like the mists

on the mountains, around the monuments and rites and ceremonies of the past. The apostles of culture do not turn to the raw frontier for inspiration but visit ancient civilizations. They are antiquarians more frequently than pioneers. The love of beauty has often been the ally of superstition and the foe of progress. Like Aaron with the golden calf, it has sought to retain the delusory forms of an abandoned belief. In truth, neither æstheticism nor mysticism are pioneers. With its dislike of activity and its reliance on passive receptivity mysticism has shrunk from the reconstructon of old consecrated formularies and from the battle of the reformer in doctrine or ethics. How well Whittier puts it:

"Spare," Art implored, "yon holy pile,
That grand old, time-worn turret spare!"
Meek Reverence, kneeling in the aisle,
Cried out, "Forbear!"

Young Romance raised his dreamy eyes,
O'erhung with paly locks of gold,—
"Why smite," he asked, in sad surprise,
"The fair, the old?"

It is just as important to realize the limitations of æstheticism and mysticism as it is to appreciate the limitations of the reason. Just now, under the influence of Pragmatism there is a great revolt from excessive intellectualism. But

in truth these separations are only in theory, or for the sake of clearness, like the distinctions of mind, and emotion, and will. It is one of the great benefits bestowed on us by the Pragmatic philosophy that it has shown that philosophy has been one-sidedly intellectual, and ignored too much the variety of our endowments, arguing upon propositions with a serene unconsciousness that much of reality is unstatable in propositions. The mind has been treated too much as a mere calculating machine, and the essential difference between the mind and a calculating machine has not been realized, especially in this point that the machine is entirely indifferent to the quality of the items it records, whether they be items of extravagance, or wise expenditure, items of honest gain or ill-gotten gain, just charges or overcharges, profits or losses; whereas the human mind accompanies the register of every item with a judgment of value—judgments which are not mere feelings, but also criticisms of the mind and effective motives for the will. The valuations which enter into these judgments cannot be overlooked in deciding what is reasonable. These values are based on intuitions of beauty, as well as intuitions of right, intuitions of duty, intuitions of worth of all kinds.

This is one of the most important principles of modern philosophy. Martineau anticipated it in

his theory of the hierarchy of values. At the recent International Conference of Philosophy in Cambridge, the validity of value judgments was generally admitted. The ultimate problem of law, said Dean Pound, is "a matter of relative values." "The classification, recognition and delimitation of claims must proceed on a scheme of values." "To separate value and reality," said Professor Urban, "leads to contradiction and unintelligibility. This much is coming to be realized, I think, by the most varied forms of philosophical thinking. It is this tacit admission, moreover, I am inclined to believe, that constitutes the underlying motive of the revival of interest in the mystical element, so characteristic of the thought of the present time." But it is unnecessary to multiply quotations. The large place given to values and mysticism was one of the outstanding features of the congress.

It is to a reason of this kind, a reason armed with value judgments, that we must submit the demands of Christianity, to ascertain whether they are rightful claims—not the reason of the eighteenth-century thinkers, that potted extract of man, called a reasonable being, which used to be used as a standard of rationality in exactly the same way that the old political economists used to measure all values by their hypothetic economic man, who knew nothing but pecuniary

values. Reason shall with us signify the man's personality, judging and deciding, armed with all its energies, responses to and insights into reality. I hope that I shall be able to make it clear later that it is this reason, and not the dry, desiccated reason of the ultra-intellectualists that has built up science and gained all our victories over nature. This will come in the next chapter. It is sufficient here to indicate the sense in which the word Reason is used, and the kind of reasonableness that is claimed for Christianity.

It is unnecessary to spend any time on the word Christianity. I use it vaguely for the religion of which Jesus is the chief teacher and the supreme Incarnation. Much that was once thought to be essential in its teaching has come to be recognized as infiltration from other sources—Jewish theology, Greek philosophy, Roman law, ancient mysteries, feudalism, and so on. This mass has been sifted for us by scholars, and much has become incredible. I assume as admitted that the Bible has followed the Church into the category of a provisional guide, and that the final verdict on these ancient beliefs must be registered by the individual. Rightly viewed, this must be regarded as a great gain—a profit and not a loss. For this loss signifies that we have returned to the condition of the converts in the heroic first century of the Christian era, before the New

Testament writings were collected into a volume; when the Church was not yet an œcumenical organization, nor the Biblical canon established; when converts had to be won by the inherent power of the message to the life of the messenger. Then faith was indeed a great adventure. In the subsequent ages when Christianity became the religion approved by the secular authority, with prestige of success and numbers, faith altered its character and became assent to tradition and a counsel of prudence rather than a heroic experiment. In this metamorphosis it lost much of its moral and regenerative power. It is our confident hope that in a return to first principles, made necessary by the falling down of the scaffoldings of dogma, it will regain this early vigor, and equipped with this new vitality will break through the walls of conservatism and specialization that have kept its leaven from leavening the whole lump of society, pleasures as well as worship, political as well as ecclesiastical life, business and work, as well as meditation and devotion.

Our hope is that the lightening of the baggage is only a preliminary to a march in conquest of hitherto unsubjugated realms. We do not march, however, into these new regions with naked hands, weaponless and without equipment. We have no chart of the seas, but we have the old

principles of navigation. When the things that can be shaken are removed, the things that cannot be shaken become manifest. With these things that remain the rest of the volume will be occupied.

Christianity's theory of man will be the subject of our next chapter. This will be followed by chapters on God, Inspiration, Providence, and Miracles.

CHAPTER II

MAN

THE fundamental assumption of religion is the uniqueness of man, as a personality who thinks, feels and wills. This is the instinctive judgment of common sense. It is an inevitable judgment, that people cannot avoid in the conduct of their lives. Upon it is built our whole social life and system of jurisprudence. Far-reaching would be the results if it could be overthrown, and man could be proven to be a mere product of physical, chemical and biological causes, with as little power over himself as the plume of steam, that has escaped from the locomotive's cylinder, has over the operation of the train. In that case all his ideals, hopes, his griefs and raptures, his fears and his aspirations, his philosophy and ethics, as well as his religion, would be mere by-products, epiphenomena, such stuff as dreams are made of.

It is no wonder therefore that a great outcry has been raised by the claims of some scientists that science in its victorious march has now taken over from philosophy the study of man, and has conclusively shown that the verdict of conscious-

ness is an illusion; that evolution, having explained the genesis of man's body, will also explain his mind and his sense of personality; his ethics and his glands accounted for in the same fashion. The prestige of science is so great that these claims have awakened lively fears. Ignorant of the pronouncements of eminent scientists and philosophers in such a book as *Science, Religion and Reality,* that there is no real conflict between science and religion, many people have accepted these boasts of radical scientists as authoritative and representative.

This is far from being the opinion of those scientists who have any tincture of philosophy, and appreciate the limitations of their methods. But some of these materialistic scientists have been very blatant, and their noisy propaganda excites a natural alarm among those who believe in ethics and religion. I am not one of those who hold that their concern is groundless. As Lotze has well said, "Error in philosophy can be as harmful as error in any other department." Indeed the statement would be more accurate if it ran, "more harmful than in any other department," for nowhere can the effects be so far-reaching as in this department that seeks to unify all others.

Religious people are quite right in dreading science when it arrogates the rôle of philosophy.

The inevitable result must be a degraded philosophy. No one can put a high value on thought, and treat such a fundamental error as a materialistic philosophy, for that is the kind of philosophy that "evolution" gives when it takes the form of a philosophy, as anything else than a menace to all the high aims of mankind.

It was, however, a great error in judgment in the religious people of the South to enact laws forbidding the teaching of the Darwinian theory in the public schools. Not only is the proper defense of the truth argument, and not legislation after this fashion, but such legislation falls into the very mistake of these scientists and confounds the functions of science and philosophy. A scientific theory may be true in the realm of matter, without being a safe guide in the realm of thought. Might governs matter, but might cannot govern spirit, nor make right.

The theory of development is a scientific theory, that in its main outlines is as solidly established as any theory of science. It controls all modern science, and has influenced every department of thought. It is quite beyond the jurisdiction of any legislatures, however sovereign the state may be.

But the mistakes have not all been on one side. It was a capital error on the part of the upholders of the right of teaching this scientific theory to

employ as their counsel a notorious agnostic, and sophistical arguer against the moral responsibility of criminals for their wrong-doing. The selection of such an advocate left the impression that evolution and agnosticism were inseparable. The most effective defender of the scientific theory would have been some Christian. He could easily have been found. That there is no such connection between this scientific hypothesis and unbelief was shown by Asa Gray. This great botanist was one of the earliest and most influential disciples of Darwin. Yet the theory never shook his Christian faith. John Fiske made contributions to the theory that Darwin himself admired and accepted, but no one has argued more ably for the existence of God and the immortality of man than this same John Fiske in his well-known brochures.

The truth of the matter is, that there has been a widespread neglect of philosophy and we are paying the penalty of the mistake. Science, once overlooked in education, has pushed into the educational tent, and like the camel in the story, has crowded out the former occupant. Philosophy, with its methods of introspection, is supposed to be outmoded and behind the times. Psychology, with its scientific methods of measurement of reactions, is thought to have superseded metaphysics.

In old times ministers and lawyers were expected to have a basis of philosophy in their thinking. This discipline has, however, been pushed aside by psychology, sociology, economics, and critical scholarship, i.e., scientific methods applied to language and historical documents. The consequence has been that these leaders of thought have not been qualified to inform the community on the exact distinction between a scientific theory and a philosophical principle, or to keep the scientists in their proper place.

This last has been no unnecessary task, for every specialist has a tendency to treat his point of view and methods as of value in every department, and needs correction and supplementing by men of other training. Scientists have been especially in need of these restraints, because of their extraordinary success in their own sphere. With some of them their great success and prestige has gone to their heads, and, like a millionaire who regards himself as an authority on art, education and theology, because he has been a great success in amassing money, they have undertaken to speak authoritatively on all sorts of topics. This tendency has been increased by their neglect of philosophy. A fair acquaintance with science is expected of a philosopher. Indeed, Leibnitz was great as a mathematician as well as a philosopher, and Kant anticipated Laplace in one famous

hypothesis. But most scientists show little interest in metaphysics. There has been an improvement in this respect of late years, since the recent great renewal of philosophical interest, but it has not yet extended to the rank and file of the profession. Scientists as a rule have almost as little metaphysics as they have Latin and Greek. They treat the whole field of study with indifference, and in some cases with contempt—as, for instance, Dr. John B. Watson, who studies mind along scientific lines, and asserted recently in a magazine article that philosophy is dying and within fifty years will be dead. He dropped the remark casually, as a matter of no moment, and of general admission. It doubtless excited much merriment at the Sixth International Congress of Philosophy which gathered so many distinguished thinkers from all parts of the world at Harvard last year, and aroused such widespread interest by its brilliant papers. Perhaps it is to this manifested one-sidedness of some scientists, as well as to the recognized limitations of scientific methods, that we owe the extraordinary revival of philosophical activity, and the new interest in mysticism, not only in Europe and America, but throughout the world.

For what is the method of science?

Ask a scientist to explain anything, and how does he go about it? He at once begins to unravel

the robe of reality. Many values are at once lost in the process. That is of no importance, because they have no bearing on his special problem, but we realize that they do not therefore cease to exist. The mathematician ignores value-judgments, or quality, the physicist ignores life, the biologist ignores consciousness. Present any complex to a scientist, and he thinks that he explains it by resolving it into its original elements. All complex things are treated as multiples of the properties of simple things. The meager qualities and limited repertoire of the simple are merely multiplied a certain number of times to make the complex result. Scientific explanation is equivalent to mathematical analysis. If the method were universalized philosophy would be, in Hobbes's phrase, "nothing but addition and subtraction." Now philosophers realize that such explanation does not explain. Many complex things have properties not convincingly describable as the multiples of the properties of the simple things through the combination of which they arise. As Professor Lovejoy has well said: "The eventual triumphs of the principle in modern science were made possible, only through its restriction to the physical order, after that order had first been carefully purged of the classes of facts most recalcitrant to such application." The professor has given the old process of science with

great accuracy. "The recalcitrant facts were first carefully purged away."

The method can only be successful if restricted to the physical order. Yet even here the facts must be carefully selected. The properties of water are not convincingly described as a combination of the properties of oxygen and hydrogen. Nobody could predict water from knowing these gases. Nor can the properties of a living organism be explained as a combination of the properties of its chemical elements. The proponents of Emergent Evolution point this out most effectively. The philosophers have made it plain that mathematical and mechanical explanations do not fit the phenomena of life. Still less are they applicable to the phenomena of mind.

An elementary acquaintance with the first principles of reasoning ought to save us from this error. I hold that the methods of science can never overthrow an instinctive and inevitable judgment of common sense, like our belief in the uniqueness of our personality. For what is the basis of science itself, but the instinctive and inevitable judgment of common sense that the external world is a reality and that the senses are to be trusted? This is the corner stone of its whole vast edifice. This is so well known that it needs no elaboration. If common sense is to be trusted in the one case, why not in the other? It

is absurd to allow logic to take its stand on one premise and build up on that basis a great battering ram to overturn some other premise equally fundamental. The procedure is illogical. Moreover, the conclusion is incredible. This is a question that every man is compelled to decide for himself; one of those questions that, as Dr. Oliver Wendell Holmes said, most of us decide in our cradles.

We know instinctively that thought belongs to another realm from digestion. The conviction lies too deep for argument. Indeed, the explanation of mind by anything else involves a manifest absurdity; to explain is to reduce to simpler and clearer terms. But what can be simpler than mind, which unifies all our experiences—or what can we know better? If a cutler were to boast that he had a steel knife of such surpassing keenness that it could carve up itself, we should laugh him to scorn. Exactly similar is the claim that mind can be analyzed away.

So when the Behaviorist asserts that the only sound method of scrutinizing mental processes is by external tests and measurements, denying the existence of consciousness, and explaining thought as a mere windy process of the larynx, I hold that Dr. Broad is quite justified in dismissing such statements as "silly."

The case would be no better, however, if the

argument were more plausible. The more brilliant the reasoning the more incredible such a conclusion. Mind can no more explain away mind, than man can lift himself by his own bootstraps. All the discoveries of science are only so many additional proofs of the uniqueness and validity of our mental processes. The mathematician does not fear that dissection of his brain will ever invalidate his theories. Why should the moral philosopher be fearful lest psychology undermine ethics?

Common sense and philosophy are at one on this point. I know that the plea is advanced that since the mind was developed by meeting the body's needs, therefore its abilities are unequal to constructing a philosophy or investigating the nature of reality. But if the mind is of this nature, how are we to explain the irresistible urge to philosophy? As J. B. Baillie has said, "Few philosophers seem to have realized the importance of finding a place for philosophy itself within the philosophical theory advanced, or what that requirement involves." These Positivists afford a signal illustration of this error. If the mind has no capacity for generalization of this kind, then their own philosophy is discredited by its own argument.

Let me not be misunderstood as making light of the difficulties that beset knowledge. How we

know is one of the ultimate problems. Many profound thinkers have grappled with it: Descartes, Locke, Berkeley, Hume, Reid, Kant, Fichte, Hegel, and the modern philosophers, not least among them the Pragmatists. In my judgment, no one has stated the problems more lucidly than Mr. Balfour in his *Defence of Philosophic Doubt*. To my mind he has made it clear that all knowledge is based on faith in certain basic and irresistible assumptions, which the mind instinctively makes and trusts. But it is unnecessary to descend to those depths, or rise to those heights, whichever way the process may be regarded. It is generally agreed by modern philosophers that epistemology has occupied the attention of philosophers too exclusively. We may leave it to the experts. No explanation of knowledge can be of any importance unless there is such a thing as knowing. Before explaining mind, we must agree on a description of it, and I claim that thinking cannot be properly described as a process of causation. The rejection of this theory is a common judgment, it is intuitive and decisive. I am not unconscious of the problem created by the natural history of mind which seems the unavoidable consequence of accepting the natural history of man. It is, indeed, a task to reconcile the claims of knowledge to supply valid truth about the world with the undoubted

fact that the human mind—and therefore all that it produces, including human knowledge—is subject to temporal change, and has a history. This is the special task of metaphysics. It is its province to devise a rational scheme whereby opposite principles like matter and life, causation and reasoning, shall be brought into unity or harmonized. But, to quote the language of Wildon Carr, "To reduce them to one another, to present life as emerging from matter, or to represent thought as a causal process, even if it could be conceived as accurate description of historical facts, would be no solution, for it would not explain. What our rationalizing human nature demands is an enterprise which will transcend the scientific facts in order to see the true nature of reality of which they are fragmentary and partial aspects."

These deep questions, however, need not concern us here. This much is sun-clear and fundamental; the solution can never be reached by discrediting mind, the agent which is to effect it. We take our stand on the "primary certitude of experience," that the mind is not a mere recorder or receiver, but is a creative agent.

The freedom of the will can be vindicated by exactly the same line of argument; for freedom of the will simply means the uniqueness of the will. If will is nothing but a scale which dips down on the side where there is the heaviest

pressure, and the final decision is a causation and not a selection, then there is no such thing as choice in the general meaning of the term. But consciousness tells us that choice is unlike anything in physics, that in a choice personality has the power of reacting upon motives, and modifying reciprocally the forces that affect it. Religion holds that consciousness is to be believed. Here again religion has the support of common sense.

On this point the judgment of common sense is as instinctive and irresistible as upon the uniqueness of knowing. Science has a weakness for the necessitarian view, but philosophy on this point also agrees with common sense. The most opposite schools of philosophy are united in this judgment.

Lord Haldane can speak for the Hegelians. His language is explicit: "The mind's freedom to choose is implicitly present in every form of its activity. The barest awareness presupposes freedom in its activity as the condition of its possibility. To be free in the sense of being capable of intelligent choice is of the very nature of mind." [1]

It is a far cry from Hegel to the Pragmatists, but their language on this point is the same. No one has pointed out more effectively than F. C. S. Schiller the difficulties in believing that past,

[1] *Contemporary British Philosophy*, p. 132.

present and future are clamped together by the iron bands of necessity, and that there is no such thing as choice, or possible variation. Determinism has been generally discarded as a philosophy. Even in the churches with Calvinistic confessions little is heard of "fixed decrees." Philosophy and ethics are both against necessitarianism. With such allies corroborating the judgment of common sense, we need not be concerned that science is loath to admit it, for choice does not belong on the level of reality, in which science works. For reality seems to exist in strata, or different levels, each of which has its own proper processes. The physicist and the chemist study in a different way from the biologist proper. The biologist studies men on a different plane from the psychologist, and the psychologist works on a different plane from the philosopher and the practical man, both of whom consider man in his entirety. Each plane has its own methods.

It is rather startling to find that many thinkers who repudiate most strongly the theory of Calvin with its degradation of the will, have been very much taken with theories about the mind as a product of the evolutionary process. The same arguments that overthrew Calvinism stand ready to defeat this new theory. A mind that is controlled by causes is just as objectionable philosophically, ethically and religiously as a will that

is determined by causes, masking themselves as motives.

But let us go deeper into this question of the nature of man. Behind all thinking and choosing and feeling lies personality, the mysterious unity that operates in these different ways. Every reaction that we make to reality, we judge to be a specific attitude or effort of a single individuality; the individual always confronting his environment with his whole being, but in some particular way in each situation. In popular language we speak of reason and will and emotion, but the terms are misleading if we regard them as separate faculties or departments, like a Legislature, Judiciary and Executive in a government. They are simply three attitudes or responses of one personality, as the captain of a ship may be a ruler of his crew, a musician, and also a fine scientist. The singleness of this individual life is central in our experience. No analyses can explain it away, for all logical processes are more or less operated by the demands of personality. In fact, man uses these demands as a clue to the nature of the universe. Humanism has emphasized the large part that human desires have played in the development of knowledge.

I admit that some scientists, in the rôle of psychologists, have sought to discredit the verdict of common sense, and of philosophy, and to deny

personality. William James was such a stimulator of thought, and such a rare and refreshing spirit, that it must ever be a great source of mingled wonder and regret to his admirers that one who did so much to free us from a mechanical conception of a block universe should have lost faith in the individuality of personality, and should have finally reached the philosophical conclusion (it could only be a closet opinion, for in the vital relations of life he could not possibly think of himself in that way) that he was but a mere channel in which flowed the waters of his separate experiences. What a philosophy! No universe, no cosmos, but only a stream of things, as incomprehensible as erratic. And no personality within, but only a stream of sensations. Pluralism without, and pluralism within. Strange conclusion of a brilliant mind. Thus does the dyer's hand become subdued to what it works in; the psychologist becomes so engrossed in the study of the processes of thought and feeling and willing, that he loses sight of the thinking, feeling, willing agent.

I realize that there are profound problems connected with the unity of personality. Take those well-known cases of so-called multiple personality. In all these cases there was a manifest unity; the so-called different personalities all knew how to speak the same language, and had a common reservoir of knowledge and skill. More-

over, we meet here again the old fundamental objection. Our sense of the unity of our personality is an *a priori* conviction, with which we deal with what is presented to the sense. Not being presented by the senses, that which is presented by the senses can neither confirm or confute it.

As Baillie has so admirably said, the unity of individuality lies behind every function by which the individual lives and moves and has his being. When he says, "I see this or that," "I did this or that," or "I think this or that," he does not mean, "my mind did this but not my body," or "my body but not my mind." He means what he says, namely, that his integral individuality is involved in the experience. The unity of his individuality is manifested in the effort to subsist; it is not found in any punctual unity within his individuality at any time nor in any ideal unity of which he may perhaps become aware and toward which he may strive. Every reaction upon or interrelation with his world is a specific direction assumed by the single individuality. The individual always confronts his environment with his whole being, but in some particular way in each situation. The interaction of the individual with his world is the way in which the individual discovers his own reality, and that of his world.[2]

[2] See "The Individual and His World," by J. B. Baillie, in *Contemporary British Philosophy*.

Of course this is accomplished in more ways than by logic. That is only one method, and not the chief one. No process of logic can ever exhaustively analyze the experience, or convey the experience, and certainly no process of logic can ever take it away.

For what is it that brings the past into the present, and molds the product of the past for the future, except personality? What is it that accompanies every experience or discovery with a judgment of value, except personality? What is it that surrounds the hard actualities with the atmosphere of possibility except the creative power of personality? As Hocking points out, "The mind holds together past, present and future; it holds together fact and value; it holds together the actual and the possible. Take these three syntheses by themselves. Every object of physical nature belongs to one side of these pairs, not to both sides; every such object is an actual present fact. The mind, then, differs from every object of nature in being in addition a hold upon the possible, the future, the valuable or, to put these together, upon possible future value. Its essential activity is to bring possible future value into connection with actual present fact." It is the only agency, the only organ, known to us that works in this fashion. This is its unique distinction.

Unique in thinking, in willing, in its individuality, it is plain that we have in man a unique being of a different quality from things material, or things living, but without self-consciousness. A uniqueness that is instinctively and irresistibly believed, that is accepted by the common sense of the race, and admitted by the greatest philosophers, not to speak of the poets and prophets of our race, is surely one of the things that cannot be shaken, which will remain after all the mistakes and half-conceptions of the day have been done away. Heaven and earth may pass away, but this truth will never pass away. Its destruction would involve not merely the overthrow of the cloud-capped towers of religion, it would carry with it the validity of our knowledge of "the great globe itself, and all which it inherit." Religion could not conceivably have a more solid basis.

I have, however, referred so cursorily to the emotional equipment of man, whereby he makes judgment of value, that it will be wise to dwell on this peculiarity of his nature, as it will play no unimportant part in our subsequent discussion. Not only do we think and will, we also feel, and each of these modes of reaction to reality is distinctly different. All are held together by, and all fall within the life of the one individual. But we cannot derive them from one another. Each

involves a specifically different call upon the resources of the individual. Each is a specifically different reaction toward the world of objects. It seems impossible to show from any fundamental principle, why the individual should have these varied ways of adjusting himself to his world. Just as it is impossible to show why he should have more senses than one, or why one sense differs qualitatively from another. All that we can say is that we have these forms of experience. We think, we feel, we will and act. We have seen that neither thinking nor willing can be explained away. What shall we say about feeling, and the judgments of value, which are the product of the united action of thought and feeling?

Here again, we have the old objection that these judgments can be shown to be the results of heredity and environment, and have no such validity as is assigned to them by the moralists and religious people. Perhaps it would be well to make a distinction here, that might have been made earlier. No one denies heredity and environment have great influence upon our thinking and our preferences and our tastes. The point is that in the exact proportion in which our opinion is molded by such causes, in that degree we regard it as deprived of rationality; it becomes an idiosyncrasy, and not a valid judgment. Just as a

choice or a decision that is shown to have been brought about by outside forces, beyond the control of the individual, ceases to be regarded as an act of the will, involving moral accountability. If it is caused, it is no longer a decision.

The same distinction must be made with value-judgments. There are, of course, many value-judgments that are manifestly the product of heredity and environment, and as such have no universal value. But there are others that are foundation stones in our life, which we cannot go behind. They are not so much products, as conditions of our activity. They are ultimate. It is somehow better to be good than bad, generous than mean, brave than cowardly, pure than dissolute, unselfish than selfish. No argument can have any effect on these convictions. Their base is deeper than argument; it lies in the nature of our personality.

It would be a mistake to limit these ultimate judgments of value to ethics; they extend to æsthetics, and enter into all our thinking and acting. They are part of that *a priori* equipment with which we deal with what is presented in sense.

It is the characteristic of this *a priori* equipment, so to speak of it, that it seeks to justify itself by relating itself to experience, and proving itself fruitful of results. It makes certain "demands" of life. Some of these demands are

subject to modification. But others are so deeply seated that man refuses to accept as final any experience which does not conform to their requirements, as for example, the demand that the universe must be rational, or that duty has a supreme claim to obedience. Such demands as these are used as clues to the nature of the universe, in spite of facts to the contrary. Experiences which do not conform to these demands we refuse to accept as final, and we think lightly of people who abandon them easily. Our highest reverence goes out to the idealist who holds on to these values at all hazards, who, thwarted at every turn, reviled by men and opposed by the facts of life, his plans defeated, his reasoning rebutted, still refuses to admit that his policy is wrong, or that he is finally defeated, and who regards the fire at which he is burnt as "a candle that will never be put out," or his cross of shame as a means of drawing all men unto him. On these basic judgments of value religion largely rests.

We have an instinctive sense of the value of our own personality; in fact, our whole relation to the world is a series of active efforts of adjustment, assimilation, and detachment. As we balance our bodies instinctively when we walk, so inwardly instinct is perpetually seeking to conserve and develop our personality, and preserve

a balance between it and experience. Religion is a supreme effort in this direction. A basic instinct like this reason can justify, but it is powerless to destroy. For reason with its logical processes is neither the whole of personality, nor the unifying element in personality. Individuality lies deeper than reason, and functions in other ways besides reasoning. Indeed in other levels of experience, it seems to function more accurately. Our senses, for example, are less fallible than our reasoning powers. The function of abstract thought is less fully developed in man's life than certain other functions of his personality. It has been said, "If human beings were left to the sole exercise of their powers of reflection to maintain their lives, the race of mankind would probably be extinct within a year."

It is in this interior and most sacred realm of personality that value-judgments are formed by a mysterious blending of feeling and thought and purpose. These basic judgments constitute a scale by which we grade our experiences. They adopt the great ends of truth, beauty and goodness. In some mysterious way we feel that through these values our personality is enriched and enlarged.

The supreme enhancement is obtained through religion. As Baillie well says: "In his religious experience at its best, the individual is aware of

himself as securely established beyond the reach of mutability. He regards himself as eternal and at one with the Eternal. His spirit is fulfilled in meeting the supreme face to face."

Thus value-judgment proves a veritable Jacob's ladder leading up to God.

It is to reason, controlled by personality, and armed with these instincts and demands that the traditions that we have received from our forefathers must be submitted for examination—whether they be derived from Church or Bible. This is the ultimate authority or judge.

Not only is this the ultimate foundation, but it is also the foundation that gives the proof the moral quality that is claimed for the result. Life has the quality of adventure, and possesses a game flavor. The proof of the great spiritual convictions has a spiritual character. The belief in God, to take a specific instance, certainly would not have this character of adventure if God could be perceived like the sun, or demonstrated like a proposition in Euclid. Since, however, the nature of man is the basis of the proof, then the fullness of his realization of God depends on the richness, fullness and spirituality of his manhood. The pure in heart see God, and the earthly and sensual find him nowhere.

Such a method of proof fits in well with the claims of Christianity. We are not in the position

of the Positivist, who invalidates his conclusion by his own arguments, making generalizations to prove that the mind has no power of generalizing. Our method of establishing religion is approved by religion. The proof and the conclusion are harmonious.

It may, however, be objected that such reliance on common sense as has been exhibited is thoroughly unphilosophical, for if common sense is to be relied on in this fashion, philosophy is made of no value. Undoubtedly the dislike of reaching this tame conclusion has been the explanation of many an ambitious system of philosophy. Martineau pointed this out long ago in his *Types of Ethical Theory*. But modern philosophy has revolted against abstracting philosophy from life. It is tired of that desiccation of reason, till it means merely analysis and deduction. This is the inner meaning of Humanism and Pragmatism. We are disgusted with the narrow dogmatism of a narrow logic. Flowers cannot be studied to advantage when dried and pressed, and life cannot be understood by drying up all its rich interests and vitalities.

Modern philosophy does not feel bound to bring back something new, it is sufficient that its teachings be true to life. Truth, not novelty, is philosophy's quest. At any rate science has no right to object to this vindication of common sense, for

as I have so repeatedly pointed out, its whole fabric rests on the reliability of common sense. Neither will religion object, for its belief in the Benevolence at the heart of the universe would find a great stumbling block in its way if it could be shown that the light that lighteneth every man, as he makes his way into this world, giving meaning to his experiences, and rounding out his personality was so different from the light that irradiates the universe that he had in it no secure guide on ultimate issues. Religion that tells us that the spirit of man is the candle of the Lord cannot be displeased to submit the matter to each man's judgment, in confidence that he has the necessary endowments to seek and to find.

CHAPTER III

THE EXISTENCE OF GOD

In discussing the doctrine of God, the first consideration that forces itself upon our attention is that the center of interest in the discussion has shifted. In the first centuries of Christianity, the theme was the nature of the Trinity. In the last centuries it was the relation of God to the universe. To-day the emphasis is placed on his immanence. This variation in emphasis, this reshaping of so fundamental a doctrine has given rise to doubt and disbelief.

Religion is properly regarded as an effort to penetrate the phenomenal and temporal, and get in touch with the real and eternal. In this swift current of life, we seek to take our stand on the Rock of Ages. Only a Jesus Christ who is the same, yesterday, to-day, and forever, seems adequate to our needs. The fundamental creed must be *quod semper, ubique et ab omnibus creditum est.*

This passionate desire for a sure resting place has been gravely disturbed by the rise of so many

new customs, and teachings in the church on various subjects. But something like panic arises when the mutations extend even to the doctrine of God. Where can we take our stand, people cry, if the Rock of Ages itself shakes? If this doctrine is mutable, what grounds have we for thinking that anything will endure? If God is to be regarded as the noblest work of man, may it not be that as mankind gives up monarchy on earth, it will cease to believe in a monarchy in the sky, and may come to look upon this universe as like a commonwealth in being self-regulating? General Smuts's theory of Holism of a universe that is slowly climbing up by its own inherent force to something higher and more thoroughly unified, is a conception of that kind. Along that line people have traveled to Ethical Culture Societies or crass agnosticism.

The underlying idea in such forebodings is that change is a sign of decay, and that variation in form is a proof that there is no underlying reality.

Yet the opposite theory is far more reasonable. What better sign of life could there be than persistence in spite of change? This is the way we reason in other departments. In our personal life we appreciate that death is near when growth has ceased, and the power of adjustment is lost. A science which is not vitalized by new theories is recognized as on the wane. Why, then, should

change be regarded as a sign of decay in theology? Some will answer that in this department of thought the form of doctrine must be permanent because theology rests on revelation. But the Bible itself shows progress in the doctrine of God. Church history reveals mutations in the doctrine of God in the Church. Indeed, such change was inevitable. Religion must be appropriated according to the mind's capacity and mode of thought, and as men grew in spirituality they conceived of God more spiritually. Moreover, the doctrine of God is drawn from nature (animate and inanimate) as well as from the Bible, and was inevitably enlarged and modified, as we learned more of both manifestations of the Divine.

The real wonder is that, starting from such different cultures and conditions, thinkers have reached practically the same conclusion, viz., that before all, under all, over all, sustaining, guiding, controlling, is a Supreme Spirit from whom we draw our life, the Cause of all things, and also, the End of all things, in that His purpose determines all things.

Various indeed are the theories about the nature of His spirit, and various the lines of argument by which these conclusions are reached. It is, however, a superficial way of thinking to hold that these theories discredit one another. No one argues that way in morals, where we have exactly

the same phenomena of diversity of theory. All the moralists are in practical agreement in their conclusions, as to what is ethical conduct in concrete cases. Where they differ is in the lines of argument whereby they justify the conclusion. The inference that we draw in ethics from this agreement in conclusion, and disagreement in argument, is, not that the conclusion where they agree is wrong, but that the conclusion is more certain than the arguments by which it is reached; that while these thinkers imagine themselves to be explorers wandering out into regions uncharted and unknown, actually they have, by an inner instinct, apprehended the goal, and all their baggage was checked for it from the first; that this goal was, in fact, selected by their whole personality, on inspection, so to speak, and that the business of the intellect had been to find the way to that goal from the premises in which each man lived and reasoned. The meeting of so many travelers at one point, journeying as they do from such different standpoints, only establishes the conclusion more solidly.

Surely the same reasoning is applicable to the doctrine of God. God has been the conclusion of every kind of philosophy (except Positivism, which is the denial of the validity of philosophy). Plato reached Him on the wings of speculation and by the theory of ideas; Aristotle by the lad-

der of logic; Descartes by his celebrated ontological argument, Spinoza, Locke, Berkeley, each by his own special road. When Kant could not discern His existence through the critical reason, he builds up another line of argument and reaches Him through the practical reason. Hegel, contemplating man's threefold endowments, holds that reason teaches the Doctrine of the Trinity. As soon as a new philosophy arises, we have a new argument for the existence of God. And Alexander, with his Emergent Evolution, argues for a God, at the end, rather than "in the beginning,"—but a God he must predicate.

A conclusion reached by so many lines, is, I hold, like ethical distinctions, not so much the result of logic, as a conclusion demanded by all departments of our complex nature by inspection. We find it eminently reasonable that the Being who fills all things, with whom the earth is crowded, with whose energy every bush is ablaze, should thus be felt everywhere, and in minds in every stage of culture and with every variety of endowment. Creative spirits working on the lower or finite scale impress themselves upon all their handiwork. A great poet's style is felt in every phrase and line, a great artist's method in every sketch. How reasonable is it then that God, working on a larger scale, should so impress Himself upon His creatures that each man should con-

ceive of Him according to his capacity, and climb to Him by his own method; the totality of nature calling for Him with such power that His existence is more certain to us than the lines of argument whereby we reach our conclusion.

So much for the speculative objection that such varieties of proof and mutations in theory disprove one another, and weaken the proof of God's reality. The reverse is the truer view.

Common sense, of course, never has any doubt of the existence of God. As soon as the doctrine is announced, common sense accepts it, both for its practical value, and also because it meets the demands of the totality of our powers, of our instinct as well as our reason. As for the corroborations which the Mystic and the poet bring to the doctrine, common sense hardly knows how to treat these allies. As a rule common-sense folk distrust the mystics, with their appeals to emotion and their neglect of logic. Indeed, common sense dreads the Mystics more than the narrow logician, with his little premise and far-stretching lines of deduction, and is inclined to wonder whether their testimony is of any value. But this is surely a mistake. The testimony of the Mystics is of the greatest weight. The special endowment of these gifted folk is their ability to rise above the partial, and contemplate the whole. Most people are too much engrossed with details to see

the entirety; too much confined in houses to see the city; too conscious of trees to see the woods. Now there are other methods of apprehending and appreciating reality besides analyzing it. The parts cannot be rightly understood except through the whole. Things must be considered in their totality, as well as in their various strata and levels, and in their separate elements. This vision of the whole is possessed by the poets and Mystics. Reality is more fully mirrored in their sensitive natures than in the minds of the less perceptive but more logical reasoners. The Mystics appreciate more of the facts, and do not allow the logical faculty to domineer over the instincts. For the intellect is almost as fond of domineering as the will. Not only does it cut up reality into sections in order to study it, often drying the vitality out of it for the purpose of this examination, as leaves are dried for preservation and cataloguing in a herbarium; but the logical faculty has a way of bullying in the interest of its own conclusions the other departments of the mind. When Galileo tried to make the reasoners of his day open their eyes and see the phenomena of nature, he discovered that they could only see what the philosophy of Aristotle and the logic of Scholasticism permitted them to see. "Their logic," Galileo complained, "raped their senses." The process is admirably exemplified when a child

attempts to draw a table. The child's knowledge of the shape of the table does not permit him to perceive that it has an entirely different shape as seen from the side. Every artist knows that he has to free his senses from the domination of his intellect; in Galileo's phrase he refuses to allow the intellect to rape the senses. Now the mystics refuse to let the network that science draws over the face of nature hide from their eyes her divine expression. They won't allow intellect to bully their insight. They feel God, see Him, hear Him. God is to them a present reality.

Their testimony is of great value. They give us the verdict of our emotional nature.

Further corroboration is furnished by the practical people who speak for the will. Gibbon's sneering tone ought not to make us overlook his statement that statesmen found religion useful. No one put it more pungently than the French orator who declared that God was so essential to the welfare of the state, that if He did not exist, He would have to be invented. The argument is trite, but it is too valuable to be omitted.

The demand of the practical reason for God is implicitly acknowledged in the paper that Dean Pound read at the Sixth International Congress of Philosophy. "Jurisprudence," said this great master of Law, "asks Philosophy's assistance in working out a scale of values, but it cannot wait

until this task is fulfilled, nor ally itself to one philosophical starting point. Until we get a method that is compatible with divergent philosophical starting points, we shall make little progress." Note the kind of basis required, one that is compatible with divergent starting points. Is not that just what the doctrine of God supplies: a basis that is stronger than any philosophical proof; a conclusion that is compatible with many divergent starting points? "No progress in International Law," continues Dean Pound, "is possible without such a basis." What is that but another way of saying that the practical reason cannot combine mankind successfully under a Common Law, until we have a common basis? Such a basis as is supplied by belief in God, a belief stronger than argument, and compatible with many lines of argument.

This judgment is corroborated by the statement by the same high authority that "the attempt of the nineteenth century to divorce jurisprudence and hence law, and international law, from all considerations of morals, has proven futile in every connection." Similar futility will be, I am persuaded, the result of the effort to dissociate ethics and Theism.

I shall turn to the testimony of reason presently, for I believe that all departments of our nature call for God, the reason as well as the emo-

tions and the will. But I want first to emphasize the force of this testimony to God from the totality of our powers; the weight of this agreement, that exists apart from the lines of proof whereby it is reached; because it seems to me that one of the causes for anxiety lest this Ark of God should be overthrown has been the failure of religious teachers to emphasize this truth of the existence of God as it should be emphasized, their neglect to show that God is not so much a conclusion as a fundamental assumption. Who has not heard sermons in which the authority of the Church has been so exalted that it would appear that, instead of God's supporting the Church by His manifest reality and felt power, the Church supports God? Often people are told that unless they had this inerrant guide, the Church, they would be shut up to agnosticism and atheism. Indeed, His reality is often made to depend not merely on the Church, but upon a particular form of organization of the Church: Roman Catholic controversialists arguing that the Pope is our only defense against atheism and agnosticism, and Anglo-Catholics making the same claim for bishops. According to such teaching the proofs of God's existence and power are so slight and deficient in self-evidencing power that they will all ravel out without a special binding of Church polity. But surely, a Being who is related to the

universe in that tenuous way could not be He in whom we live and move and have our being, the living God, the Lord of heaven and earth; He would be only an ecclesiastic, a Pope raised to the *n*th degree.

The case is no better when the Bible is made to support God, instead of being proven by its teaching about Him. Sometimes this has a very pious sound, as, for example, when a brilliant clergyman claimed that none of the arguments for the existence of God was valid. He then ran over them all—ontological, cosmological, teleological, the moral argument. Each was pronounced deficient and inconclusive. But the people were told to be of good courage, for "they had the testimony of Jesus. He only was the Way, the Truth, and the Life." All our knowledge of God, they were informed, really depends on Him. Whatever exalts Jesus seems to some devout minds, certainly true, and so such teaching passes. But could anything be shallower or more unreal? According to the Bible itself a whole dispensation of preparation in the knowledge of God and His righteousness was necessary before the world was ready for the teaching of Jesus. His first disciples came to Him because they first believed in God. The Gentiles to whom He revealed God, through His Apostles, believed on Jesus because of the self-evidencing power of

His teaching about God. The Church and the Book each speak of God, but the conviction of His existence rests not on their external authority, but on the power of this great idea to meet the needs of our whole nature. God and man claim each other; God evidences Himself.

Of course if all departments of our nature testify of Him, it must follow that the intellect also must lead to Him, for this department of our nature has its voice in this judgment, as well as its limitations. While it must not be allowed to "rape" the perceptive powers, as Galileo put it, or to scoff at the emotions, or to sneer at experience, neither can we allow these other departments to ignore intellect.

Our perceptive faculties, our emotions and instinct develop earlier than our logical and analytical powers, and we realize that intellect ought to distrust itself and look carefully to its processes, when its conclusions are contradictory of the verdicts of these more primary and fundamental departments. It must not ignore these testimonies. Yet the intellect, too, is a department of our nature, and has its right to be heard. It also has its province; it is the pioneer element in our nature that leads us into new realms. It has a right to cast a vote. The final decision must be in accord with all the elements of our nature. It follows from this that intellect is entirely jus-

tified in looking for rational proofs of God's existence. It would be hard to believe in Him if reason pronounced a clearly argued and generally accepted negative. This denial is, indeed, claimed by some people as the clear tendency of modern thought, but I hold that they are mistaken. I will not raise the fundamental question that I referred to so frequently in discussing the spirituality of man, viz., that since common sense gives us the premises on which all our reasonings are based, it is therefore beyond the power of reasoning to overthrow the authority of common sense when it speaks so decisively as it does upon the existence of God. The branches in their growth cannot pry up the roots. This consideration is decisive with the average man. But I waive that argument. I hold that reason leads to God.

The argument for design will supply an excellent test. No argument is more popular, or more generally convincing. How could these separate cells of organisms group themselves so cleverly into plants or animals, how could the separate sexes combine to make couples, the different organs assemble themselves into a man, without some superintending mind? Rufus Choate said that he could as soon believe that the *Iliad* of Homer was produced by spilling the letters of the alphabet, as believe that nature had reached its

present form without design. The argument is as old as Cicero, and was probably trite in his day. This teleological argument has satisfied the race. But does it still satisfy expert reasoners?

What are we to say to the claim that is often made, that this argument is now exploded? I am aware that some theologians who are dreadfully afraid of being behind the times have relinquished the argument. But I hold that there is no greater proof of philosophical superficiality than a willingness to relinquish an argument so strongly approved by common sense at the demand of the analytical intellect, without a careful scrutiny of the presuppositions, as well as the lines of argument by which the negative conclusion is reached.

On examination it appears that the objections come from two quarters, first from philosophy, and secondly from science. The philosophical argument has been most powerfully stated by Kant. It is certainly somewhat appalling to have such a great master of logic on the opposite side. Still, it is worth remembering, lest we should be stampeded by the authority of his great name, that Aristotle and Leibnitz were also great philosophers, and thought differently, and that the majority lies on their side. But that consideration is mentioned only to calm alarm and not to determine the answer. The appeal is to reason, and not to authority. We are inquiring

whether reason has adequate grounds for confidence in the design argument. So we ask, what is Kant's reason for rejecting it, and here to our surprise we find that his objection is not drawn from the confusion and disorder and waste in nature, so much as from his theory of God. He cannot believe that the Omnipotent, Omniscient God, who has but to speak and it is done, can stoop to the use of means, or reach a desired end through gradual and tentative processes. God must be the Absolute, and the Absolute cannot be conceived of as limiting Himself by using means.

But suppose that we do not identify God in this way with the Absolute? Then it is clear this objection falls to the ground. Now we are not concerned in this present argument with maintaining any special theory of the nature of God: all that we are now considering is whether there is reasonable ground for believing in a creative intelligence behind the phenomena of the universe. If this theory of the Absolute is set up in opposition, of a God who is the negation of all distinctions, a God so different from all we know, that the things that are seen can make absolutely no reliable report of Him, then we do well to question such a theory of the Absolute. It is, indeed, this identification of God with this kind of Absolute, that makes Bergson

refuse to ascribe to God the creative purpose which he sees so clearly in nature. But why are we compelled to identify God with this Absolute, when the identification robs us of one of our best arguments for the Divine existence?

This theory of the Absolute seems to me to be built up after the same fashion as the mechanistic theory of the universe. Just as mechanism regards only one class of facts, so this theory of the Absolute is constructed out of another class of facts, that is, by the laws of logic, with entire disregard of other functions of our personality and of the values furnished by our instincts and our will. The Absolute, untouched by a feeling for our infirmities, is certainly not the God that religion is concerned with, nor the God revealed by nature. Kant is surely right in saying that nature does not reveal the Absolute. But then how can the Eternal, the Omnipresent, the Ineffable, the Undefinable, the Unconditioned, the Immutable, the Unconfined, in whom all things subsist, be manifested by the conditioned and temporal? Kant's objection to the design argument is based, not on the lack of design in nature, but in the fact that any contrivance is in his eyes unworthy of God. With Kant it is axiomatic that God cannot use means. But I see no reason to accept that axiom. God, claims Kant, cannot limit Himself. I grant that the Absolute cannot,

according to definition, limit Himself or Itself. But why should I assume such an Absolute? Man, who gives us our best idea of a creative intelligence, limits himself. The artist finds pleasure in self-limitation. The painter will give the sense of solidity on a plane surface; the poet will mold his thought within the narrow limits of the sonnet. Our creative gifts flourish best, I hold, in opposition to the partisans of free verse, by imposing on themselves limits and rules. The universe imposes limitations upon creative gifts in its great law of proportion.

Moreover, our very existence as personalities, dependent upon nature for existence, but yet containing within ourselves springs of will, emotion, and thought, implies that the Supreme Will, Emotion and Thought has in some way limited Himself with regard to us—perhaps in somewhat the same fashion that our brain grants a partial independence to our ganglions.

But I have no wish at this point to advocate any special mode of defining God, except this, that He must not be so defined that He cannot possibly be proven. Certainly the Absolute cannot be proven from nature. His existence is inferred entirely from the laws of thought. He is revealed by logic alone. Kant is right in claiming that nature does not reveal such a Being; such proof of Him from nature is an impossibility. But that

is no valid ground for denying that nature reveals design in the universe. And where there is design, I hold there must be some designer.

Let us remember that Kant, though a great, a supreme philosopher, lived in the eighteenth century, and had not learned the great lesson of the value of relative knowledge. With him truth was absolute. He scorned the gradual approaches of nature, yet if he had examined with the aid of Humanism the processes of thought, he would have discovered that the attainment of truth is a gradual process, and that our road is strewn with carcasses of theories, which, dead and putrifying now, were once living and helpful draft animals; that knowledge may be valid for a season, and yet not valid for all time, valid as a step to larger views, valid as part in a larger whole which when attained, will dignify and ennoble the past that it supersedes.

Modern philosophy does not scorn the relative like Kant, and therefore must regard more kindly the gradual and relative processes of nature, and need not condemn them as unworthy of an intelligent Creator.

But enough of the philosophical objection: most people are more influenced by the statement that science has destroyed the teleological argument by the theory of evolution. Yet that evolution is controlled by design has been conclusively proven

by Bergson in his *Creative Evolution.* No one is likely to do so more brilliantly or conclusively. His especial masterpiece is the discussion of the genesis of eyes, in which he shows that eyes cannot possibly be regarded as undesigned results of the survival of the fittest, since nature achieves this organ by so many diverse methods, and in case of injury sometimes by new roads; sometimes developing an eye out of the mesodermic membrane, and then again in other cases, out of the ectoderm, and then again in case of injury developing an eye in an entirely novel fashion. Such cases show clearly that nature is out for eyes.

Anyone who doubts design in nature ought to read Bergson's masterpiece, always bearing in mind that his objection to a Designer is due not to the absence of design in nature, but to his acceptance of the Absolute as the only possible view of God. I agree with Janet, that a stronger argument for design can be drawn from Sex, than even from the popular eye. But, indeed, arguments lie all around us, if we will but open our eyes and see. Take such a simple occurrence as a tree shedding its leaves. Let me quote a botanist's explanation of the fall of the leaves of decidous trees:

> The casting of the leaf is not a sudden and quick response to any single change in environmental conditions, but is brought about

with a complex interplay of processes begun days or perhaps weeks before any external changes are to be seen. The leaf is rich in two classes of substance, one of which is of no further benefit to it, and another which it has constructed at great expense of energy, and which is in a form of the highest possible usefulness to the plant. To this class belong the compounds in the protoplasm, the green color bodies, and whatever surplus food may not have been previously conveyed away. The substances which the plant must needs discard are in the form of nearly insoluble crystals, and by remaining in position in the leaf drop with it to the ground.

The plastic substances within the leaf which would be a loss to the plant if thrown away undergo quite a different series of changes. These substances are in the extremest parts of the leaf, and to pass into the plant body must penetrate many hundreds of membranes of diffusion into the long conducting cells around the ribs or nerves, and then down into the twigs or stems. The successful retreat of this great mass of valuable matter is not a simple problem. These substances contain nitrogen as a part of their compounds, and as a consequence are very readily broken down when exposed to the

sunlight. In the living normal leaf the green color forms a most effective shield from the action of the sun, but when the retreat is begun, one of the first steps results in the disintegration of the chlorophyll. This would allow the fierce rays of the September sun to strike directly through the broad expanse of the leaf, destroying all within were not other means provided for protection. In the first place, when the chlorophyll breaks down, among the resulting substances formed is cyanophyll which absorbs the sun's rays in the same general manner as the chlorophyll. In addition the outer layer of cells of the leaf contains other pigments some of which have been masked by the chlorophyll and others which are formed as decomposition products, so that the leaf exhibits outwardly a gorgeous panoply of colors in reds, yellows and bronzes that make up the autumnal display.

At a time previous to the beginning of the withdrawal of the contents of the leaf or the forming of the autumnal colors, preparations have been steadily in progress for cutting away the leaf when the proper time should arrive. At some point near the base of the leaf-stalk the formation of a layer of special tissue had begun between the woody cylin-

der in the centre and the thin epidermis. When the time for the casting of the leaf arrives, this special tissue grows rapidly, pushing apart or cutting the cells which have held the leaf rigidly in position in such a manner that finally the leaf-stalk at this point consists of the brittle cylinder of wood surrounded by the loosely adherent cells of the newly formed layer of separation. The merest touch of breath of air will split the layer of separation, break the wood, and allow the leaf to fall to the ground.[1]

How pertinent is Weldon Carr's comment in his paper on Life and Matter:

"Although trees are individual, and the process is carried out independently by every individual tree of a particular species in a specific way as part of its life process, we do not feel compelled to attribute personality and deliberation to the tree . . . (yet) it is quite clear that the action belongs to the category of finalism. It is ridiculous to class it under the category of mechanism."

I do not deny that Creative Evolution brings its own special problems. Many forms of life inspire only disgust, and many of the means employed by nature to attain her ends seem strangely at variance with our human ideal of

[1] D. T. MacDougal.

fitness. But, as Carr well observes, "On the other hand, the discovery of this history is an impressive illustration of man's intellectual grandeur. The mysterious, elusive agency which man can name, but for the secret of which he searches in vain, has produced a creature who can want to know the secret."

Let me close this discussion of the relation of science to the design argument with the statement of an eloquent Hindu philosopher, who, standing outside of European circles, has a point of vantage for estimating our tendencies:

> It is becoming increasingly evident that a scientific view of the world does not make God superfluous. The passing flux of the world is not like the heaving and the hurrying, yet ultimately unprogressive, movement of an agitated sea. The course of life is not a series of accidents but an ordered ascent from fresh beginnings of life up to man and from the primitive uncivilized man to the more spiritual type. The world is tending toward deification, to use the phrase of Alexander. The subjection of the cosmic process to law, and its tendency to produce higher values suggest a Creative Principle, operating throughout the course of nature, bringing about new and higher forms of life on the stage prepared for it by the lower. This cre-

> ative urge, this immanent drive in things, this nisus toward increasing diversity and perfection, whatever we may call it, indicates the reality of an Ultimate Spirit, which in religious terms is called God.[2]

Thus the argument for design remains, in substance, the same, though the form is changed, which change also pleases us well, since it is our fundamental contention that in a developing universe a change of form is an indication of vitality and value. Would that the limits of this chapter would permit me to take up other arguments for the Divine Existence that were relied on in the past, and show how they have been modified, without being invalidated.

Thus Lotze has given the Cosmological Argument more force by his admirable statement in the Microcosmos, and the Moral Argument has gained a new reasonableness by Lord Balfour's presentation in his Gifford Lectures on Theism and Humanism.

Even the celebrated Ontological Argument of Descartes has acquired a new vitality. I confess that this argument never appealed to me, as stated by Descartes. It seemed too much of a logomachy to argue that the idea of the most perfect thing contained within itself the guarantee

[2] S. Radhakrishnan, in *Proceedings of the Sixth International Congress of Philosophy*, A. D. 1926, p. 547.

of existence, on the ground that since no being would be perfect, that was a mere possibility, and not an actuality. I hesitated to say that an argument of which so many eminent thinkers spoke respectfully had no force. This hesitation was increased by the deference paid to it by Pringle-Pattison in his great book. Still I could personally feel no force in it, and did not care for it anyhow, since the God it inferred was the Absolute. But to-day the essence of the Ontological Argument is again asserted. We are not content to ask simply what the understanding demands of the universe; we insist that the drafts of whole personality should be acknowledged, if the universe is reasonable (our fundamental assumption). For example, our instinct of worship has steadily demanded of the universe an object of worship. "From the primitive savage kneeling down before some sacred tree or holy stone, thrilled with the thought that somewhere at the back of created matter lies and vibrates a Force, a Power beyond his knowing, down to the great faiths of to-day, men have yearned to come into touch with God."

Conscious of weakness, they have asked for strength. Conscious of blindness, they have asked for light. Conscious of sins, they have asked for cleansing. Conscious of imperfection, they have asked for holiness or completeness. Sinful as they are, they demand that the universe be moral.

All our life is dominated by the demands of personality, and we cannot but believe that the universe will show itself reasonable by supplying these demands which otherwise would be mere impertinences.

Surely this is at the core Descartes' Ontological Argument, stated in other terms. It is the claim that what our whole personality demands, the universe must contain and supply, and that since man's whole nature yearns for God, therefore a God must exist. In a large but real sense Alexander's argument for an emergent Deity is Descartes' Argument in another form.

Since mankind has such a powerful urge to this conclusion, it follows that new philosophies evolve new arguments. One of the best is supplied by William James in his well-known "Essay on Theism," in which he points out with great candor and freshness of argument that the Theistic hypothesis will probably remain for all time as our deepest response to the nature of things. Such sentences as these should be written in letters of gold on the walls of our churches and theological seminaries:

"A God is the kind of being who forms the most adequate possible object for minds framed like our own to conceive as lying at the root of the universe." *"Anything short of God is not rational, anything more than God is not possible,*

if the human mind be in truth the triadic structure of impression, reflection, and reaction we at the outset allowed." [8]

So does Pragmatism from its belief that all knowledge is hypothesis, reach the goal.

Unique as is James's charm, nevertheless I prefer the argument by which C. S. Pierce, who dropped the seed thought from which Pragmatism grew, reaches the same conclusion in what he calls the Neglected Argument for the Existence of God. It was published a decade or so ago in the *Hibbert Journal,* but has not received the recognition that it deserves.

At first blush, Pragmatism or Humanism seems almost as far from Theism as Positivism itself, but we shall find that it is able to open a direct road to the goal. The Pragmatist's premise is that the only method of discovering, or as he would phrase it, of "making truth" is to frame a hypothesis to cover the known facts. If such hypothesis works, i.e., proves fruitful of results, and enables us to control things and events, and fits into our minds comfortably, we say that it is true, and rest satisfied with it, until some facts are discovered or events occur that do not accord with the hypothesis, or our minds cease to take to it kindly, in which case we discard the hypothesis and call it untrue and frame some new one.

[8] *Will to Believe,* pp. 115, 116.

According to the Pragmatist, that is all there is in knowing, and all there is in truth. He holds it to be sufficient. It is too simple a philosophy for me, but I admit that it has been a mighty engine to overthrow many great theories that have claimed to be valid reports of reality, and yet were actually as purely intellectual tools as double entry bookkeeping. Like other philosophies, it contains an element of truth, and this element of truth leads directly to God. It is the same road that led science to so many fruitful hypotheses. Pierce gives a long list of such hypotheses. Let one example suffice. The old theory was that nature abhorred a vacuum, and that this abhorrence was the cause of the diffusion of gases. This hypothesis fitted in with the facts, and was generally acceptable till Boyle came forward and asserted that his mind did not take kindly to this personification of nature, and that the facts could be equally well handled by supposing that it was the nature of gases to diffuse themselves. As soon as Boyle expressed his aversion to the old view, other minds echoed it. The new view was found to be simpler, and therefore was accepted. It is important to note that "simpler" does not mean simpler of statement as it is often understood. Often an explanation is rejected because it seems too simple for the complex situation which it is to solve or explain. The mind will not believe

the matter is so simple. What is really meant is that it fits more readily into our minds, that the constitution of our nature accepts it, as a lock accepts the right key, without any jar and harsh grating. For our minds are part of reality just as truly as the things that we seek to explain, and we have an inexpugnable belief that the facts and our minds will dovetail with one another, like the parts of a dissected picture, if the right adjustment or theory can be found.

Take another case. Our minds find it difficult to accept action at a distance, so we conjecture ether. The theory fits in with the facts, proves fruitful in results, and we believe it.

But is not this substantially an argument for God? *Things* revealing purpose, and moving to ends, our minds cannot accept as falling into such arrangements haphazard. We cannot understand design without a designing mind. We try the idea of God, and it suits our constitution, it accords with the facts, it proves fruitful of good results in ethics, in personal life, in social life, in political life. It is therefore true. So argues the Pragmatist. Is not the argument sound? But you may say that you do not agree with the Pragmatic philosophy and its theory that truth is made, rather than found. Very well, then sit at the feet of Lord Balfour. His philosophy is based on the statement that all reasoning has to start

with premises which cannot themselves rest on reasoning, since they are its bases, the fulcrum for its lever. The mind assumes them by a law of its own nature. But our nature, as we find it, is the resultant of a long process and the environment that affects us is itself the result of long processes. Out of their interaction arise our sense of beauty, and duty, and our knowledge of the external world. How, Balfour asks, can we justify our confidence in these resultant convictions as reasonable except on this premise, that we were created by a Reasonable Being, and these processes that affect us are guided by a Reasonable Being. "Beauty must be more than an accident, and demands an artist. The source of morality must be moral. The source of knowledge must be rational." Here God is not a conclusion, but a necessary premise, just the reverse of the Pragmatist's line of approach.

Nothing can be more brilliant than Balfour's analysis of our knowledge. Looked at from within, knowledge is an instinctive process, but looked at from without knowledge seems to be the end of a process of causation. Take for example seeing the sun.

> Confining ourselves to what is directly perceived, its singular size, its shape (projected on a plane), its warmth, its brightness, its color, its (relative) motion, its separation

from the observer in space—how are these immediate experiences produced? Let us take the answers commonly accepted at the present moment. They are not only the truest, but the fullest, and for that very reason they put the difficulty with which we are concerned in the highest relief. We begin our causal series with electrons, or if you do not accept the electric theory of matter in any of its forms, then with atoms and molecules. We start with these, because the sun is a collection of them, and because it is their movements which set going the whole train of causes and effects by which the sun produces on us the perception of itself. We may take, as the next stage, ethereal vibrations of various lengths, and various amplitudes, sent traveling into space by the moving particles. A fraction of these waves reaches our atmosphere, and of that fraction, a fraction reaches our eyes, and of that fraction a further fraction falls within the narrow limits of length to which our eyes are sensible. It is through these that we are able to *see* the sun. Still another fraction, not necessarily identical in wave lengths, affects the nerves, which produce in us the sense of warmth. It is through these that we are able to *feel* the sun. But before we either see or feel, there is much to

be accomplished. The causal series is not nearly completed. Complicated neural processes as yet imperfectly understood, complicated cerebral processes—as yet understood still less—bring us to the end of the material sequence of causes and effects, and lay the message from the object perceived on the threshold of the perceiving consciousness.

So does a postman slip into your letter-box a message which has been first written, then carried by hand, then by mail-cart, then by train, then by hand, till it reaches its destination, and nothing further is required, except that what has been written should be read and understood. But messengers are expected to hand in their message in the form in which they received it. The messengers change, but not the message. The metaphor, therefore, is far too complimentary to the train of physical causes which reveal the material thing to the perceiving consciousness. The neural charges which are in immediate causal contiguity with that physical effect which we call "the experience of an external object" have no resemblance whatever to the thing perceived, or the thing as it really is. Nor have they any resemblance to the proximate cause which sets them going, namely, the ethereal vibrations, nor

> have these to the accelerated electrons, which constitute the incandescent object which we "experience" as the sun. Nor has the sun, as it is experienced, the slightest resemblance to the sun as it really is.

Balfour meets this difficulty by showing that our belief in an independent world of material objects is an irresistible assumption. This assumption, however, can only be justified as reasonable on the hypothesis of Theism. This is the reverse of Descartes' argument. According to Descartes we could trust our ideas because they are guaranteed by God's truthfulness. Balfour reverses the argument. He finds that knowledge is trustworthy, and concludes from this that a reasonable being must have made our minds. He rests belief in God on the validity of knowledge.

I cannot deny myself the pleasure of quoting the magnificent conclusion of the great Gifford Lectures on Theism and Humanism, in which this argument is splendidly developed:

> There are many persons, both earnest and sincere, to whom the conclusions which modern naturalism extracts from modern science are a source of deep perplexity and intellectual unrest. Their mood if I rightly read it, is something of this kind: They would agree

that a world where God is either denied or ignored is a world where some higher values are greatly impoverished. . . . Life, they would admit, is but a poor thing, if it does no more than fill with vain desires the brief interval between two material "accidents"—the "accident" which brought it into being, and the "accident" which will extinguish it forever. But this (they will say) is no argument. A wise man faces facts, a good man prefers the hardest truth to the most alluring illusion. If there is no ground for assuming a living purpose behind the indifferent mask of nature, let us not fill the vacancy with a phantasm of our own creation. Let us sink back into the nothingness from which we arose with our intellectual integrity undamaged. Let all other values perish, so long as rational values remain undimmed.

Here, according to my view, lies the great illusion. Those who in all sincerity and often with deep emotion, plead after a fashion like this, profoundly misunderstand the situation. They are indeed worthy of respect. They must not be confounded with those unstable souls who ignore God when they are happy, deny Him when they are wretched, tolerate Him on Sundays, but truly call on Him only when life or fortune hangs doubtfully in the balance. They are of a different and more

virile temper. But are they less mistaken? They search for proof of God as men search for evidence about ghosts or witches. Shew us, they say, the marks of His presence. Tell us what problems His existence would solve. And when these tasks have been happily accomplished, then will we willingly place Him among the hypothetical causes by which science endeavors to explain the only world we directly know, the familiar world of daily experience.

But God must not thus be treated as an entity, which we may add to or subtract from the sum of things scientifically known as the canons of induction may suggest. He is Himself the condition of scientific knowledge. If He be excluded from the causal series that produces beliefs, the cognitive series which justifies them is corrupted at the root. And as it is only in a theistic setting that beauty can retain its deepest meaning, and love its brightest lustre, so these great truths of æsthetics and ethics are but half-truths, isolated and imperfect, unless we add to them yet a third. We must hold that reason and the works of reason have their source in God; that from Him they draw their inspiration; and that if they repudiate their origin, by this very act they proclaim their own insufficient.

How profoundly true this is, and how grateful we ought to be for such words from no closet student, but from a statesman who has been trusted by a great nation to guide its destinies, and in a supreme hour, to be the voice of England to America. God is indeed not an entity to be sought like a ghost. If anywhere, He must be everywhere. All roads lead to His presence chamber, and all departments of our nature testify of Him.

As we have seen, all the various philosophies corroborate Lord Balfour's contention that our reason calls for a God.

It may be, however, that it will seem to some of my readers that I have made but little progress toward a helpful theory, since I have limited myself to the mere existence of the God that nature indicates. There would be force in this objection if this were the end of the discussion. I realize that the mere existence of God is not enough for religion. In the next chapter I shall point out the nature that we must ascribe to Him. Hooker said somewhere that before a man could have a certain character, he must exist, and the same obvious statement may be made about God. His existence is the first point: by that I mean the existence at the heart of the universe, and diffused and operating through it of a Being reasonable, volitional, moral; a cause rationally ade-

quate to the creation of creatures like ourselves, as well as the molder of our environment. On this point I believe that right reason is clear, as well as right feeling, and the testimony of experience.

When, however, we come to consider the character of God, I hold that each department requires the assistance of the others. Take intellect alone, and it may give us, as in the philosophy of Kant, an Absolute, who is the opposite of all we experience or know—infinite over against our finiteness—living in the Eternity, while we live in Time, above extension, above change, above us and our interests. Let feeling have full sway, and the Mystics be the deciding witnesses, and we shall be ourselves sparks of the eternal God, and God will be indeed all in all, since we are mere echoes of His voice, thoughts of His mind, manifestations of His will; while Will may make Him merely the Lawgiver, or the dynamo of the universe. But God demands not only our fealty in the realm of duty; He is the Lord of our whole nature, body, soul and spirit, and demands the totality of our powers that He may mirror His nature through us and to us. It is only by the combination of all these lines of argument that we can reach with any approximate correctness the true doctrine of God.

CHAPTER IV

THE PERSONALITY OF GOD

It is well to recall to your attention the point of view from which this inquiry into the validity of some fundamental religious beliefs is being conducted. We start with the assumption that religion is not a hallucination. As Clement Webb puts it, "I do not think it possible to remain content with the reduction of an experience so manifestly substantial, rational, and harmonious as a genuine religious experience can be to the rank of mere mirage or sheer illusion." [1] Mr. Bradley claims that there are other truths besides religious truths, and that it is the duty of metaphysics to supplement religion, but he admits that it cannot explain away religious value. The statement is so important that I quote his exact language:

> Whatever ideas really are required in practice by the highest religion are true. In my judgment their truth is not contradicted by metaphysics, so long only as they will not offer themselves as satisfying our last intel-

[1] *God and Personality,* p. 264.

> lectual demands. And exactly how religious truths are to be in the end supplemented and corrected, I would repeat, that as I understand the matter, metaphysics cannot say. Within the outline which it takes for real there is room for all truth and all truth is assuredly completed. But the answer in concrete detail is beyond the finite intellect, and is even beyond any mere understanding.

Exactly so: only life can reveal the modifications; they belong to that mysterious picture that cannot be known, because it is not yet made. But we can study the modifications that have recently taken place and are now going on.

The existence of God, we have seen, is the goal reached by philosophy and by common sense. But what shall we say about His personality? There was no doubt about it in the eighteenth century, when God was chiefly thought of after the fashion of Aristotle, as transcendent, the great Architect. But to-day the emphasis falls on His immanence; He is seen in the force that moves through all things, as an Élan Vital, "a nisus toward increasing diversity and complexity"; He is just as truly in us, as we are in Him. The question therefore arises inevitably, whether the Immanent God is to be thought of as personal; whether personality does not necessarily imply limitation, and demarcation; something peculiar, not the prop-

erty of all, and therefore not an attribute of Him who not only fills all things, but is completely present everywhere. The objection is serious, because, if personality is denied to God, then it is difficult to justify some of our deepest instincts such as prayer, and the testimony of religious experience is emptied of much of its meaning. If spirit with spirit can meet, how is this understandable unless they meet in the realm of personality? Certainly there are many religious values, such as the heinousness of sin, the blessedness of forgiveness, the peace of resignation and submission, that will be seriously lessened if God has not personality.

One of the great achievements of Christianity has been the creation of an exalted sense of the value of personality. It is this that has led our laws to stop all maiming and branding of criminals. It is the sacredness of personality that is desecrated in *The Scarlet Letter* by the injured husband when he worms himself into the confidence of the minister who has wronged him and seeks to secure his revenge by poisoning the soul of the man who injured him. Iago is Shakespeare's supreme villain, worse even than Edmund in Lear, who victimized his own father, because of his devilish art in entering into and corrupting the inner springs of Othello's life. Whence has this sense of the sacredness and dignity of human-

ity arisen except from the immense emphasis that Christianity has for ages laid upon personality? This emphasis in Christianity, it is worth noting, began with God, and was transferred from Him to men. Indeed personality was ascribed to God so abundantly that it became tri-personality, that is to say, personality in a supreme degree. In truth personality in the Godhead was involved in the very idea of the Incarnation, in the teaching that it was only through a person that God could with any adequacy be revealed. This much is certain, that the idea of personality in God has been of immense practical value, for prayer, for right conduct, for devotion and for morals.

The question therefore arises whether these values can be preserved without this ascription of personality. The question is inevitable, especially with those who think that Immanence and Personality are inconsistent. But immanence is not inconsistent with personality, unless it is also inconsistent with transcendence. The spirit of a man fills his whole body and sets in operation all its vital movements, but it also dominates his body; his ends and interests, obligations and ideals are outside of his skin. We therefore transcend our bodies, as every lover and thinker and ambitious man knows, all of them often dominating the body like a regular slave-driver. In our own personality, immanence and transcend-

ence are united. Why is not such a union conceivable in God?

It is assumed that the arguments that prove God's existence are satisfactory. Now what is their core except this deep conviction that since we are reasonable, feeling, willing beings, there must be at the heart of the universe reason, affection, and will? But there is something in us deeper than any one of these departments or functions of our nature, and that is the personality that combines all our experiences, the spiritual being who thinks and wills and feels and aspires. How well Matthew Arnold puts the case in his sonnet written in a volume of Butler's Sermons:

Affections, Instincts, Principles, and Powers,
Impulse and Reason, Freedom and Control,—
So men, unravelling God's harmonious whole,
Rend in a thousand shreds this life of ours.
Vain labor! Deep and broad, where none may see,
Spring the foundations of that shadowy throne
Where man's one nature, queenlike, sits alone,
Centred in a majestic unity;
And rays her powers.

This central, coördinating agency is, we feel instinctively, the deepest and highest thing in us. If the Sustainer of all has not this quality, then man is of a higher and finer nature than God. I realize that some Creative Evolutionists argue that nature is as yet without a God, and that He

is being evolved. According to that theory God is not, but will be. Certainly such a God does not meet the requirement of preserving the old values; a God not yet evolved, or a God of a lesser order than man is unthinkable, as well as of no practical value. We are conscious of our likeness to the Supreme Spirit, because of the manner in which His works, or His ways—for nature may be considered in either aspect—lend themselves to the analysis of our minds, awaken our rapture by their beauty, prove usable to us in our crafts, and, above all, because of our need of the support of His aid, His approval, and His companionship. Reason, affection, volition, are only known to us in any great degree or high quality as the attributes of personality. They do not reside in insensate things, nor in any high degree in organisms not self-conscious. In human beings alone are they found, and human beings alone are regarded by us as persons. A God who reasons and loves and wills, but has not personality is as unthinkable as a shadow without the light that casts it. It is thought without a thinker, love without a lover, and decision without a decider. Such a theory of God is not merely deficient in religious value, it is also irrational and self-contradictory.

Of course I admit that the idea of personality must be treated not as exhaustive or exact, but with proper regard to our meaning in using it.

It is certainly not the meaning that His personality shares our limitations.

We do not ascribe our reason to Him in that fashion. We own with reverence and awe that His thoughts are not our thoughts, nor His ways our ways. Our capacity of love can be but as a drop to the ocean, compared to His. Theologians have often erred in making their statements about God too definite and precise. But they have only meant to use words as symbols. Never have they thought that their language would be treated as an exact proposition. They have realized that clouds and darkness are round about Him; that the Heaven of Heavens cannot contain or express Him; still less our puny natures. So when they predicate of God personality, they do not mean to define or limit Him; they only mean that He is in quality a Being like ourselves, without denying that He doubtless has other qualities also which we in this tadpole stage are not able to imagine, just as light has rays which our eyes cannot see, and sound notes too fine and high for our ears to hear. They mean that there is something in our nature that calls for personality in God, something deeper than mere logic, the desire of the dependent for a support, of the lonely for a companion, of the creature for a Creator, of the imperfect for the Perfect, of the servant of duty for the Lawgiver.

Professor Leonard T. Russell pointed out in a brilliant paper at the last International Philosophical Congress, to which I have referred more than once, that the significance of Western science for philosophy has been largely this, that the modern scientific outlook is the result of a number of principles functioning as demands, such for example as the demand for permanence, or the demand that "self-contradictory predicates cannot belong to the same thing." Experiences which do not conform to these demands man refuses to accept as true. "He uses his demands as a clue to the nature of the Universe in spite of facts to the contrary." [2]

Personality in God is one of the deepest demands of our religious nature. A religion like Buddhism, which does not predicate it of God, proves unable to sustain morals or exalt mankind. The realization of His immanence, and of the way in which His personality can diffuse itself into ours may modify our conception of His relation to us, but it cannot destroy His personality. Indeed, in the phenomena of friendship we have examples of one personality pouring itself into another, so that we know that interfusion is possible without the destruction of personality.

Moreover, it cannot be too often insisted upon, since the point is cardinal, that no one depart-

[2] P. 304.

ment of our nature can undertake to negative the demands of other parts. We hear the voice of pure intellect in this criticism of personality as limiting the Absolute, a purely metaphysical concept of God, but there are other voices besides pure intellect, appealing to us, that must be considered, and they call loudly for this personal relationship. "The situation, we should never forget, must be taken in its entirety; and the situation in its entirety seems to justify the view that the disciplined demands arrived at by man in any sphere of his activity (e.g., pure intellect, or ethics or religion) cannot be accepted as final unless in the end they square with the disciplined demands arrived at by man in all his spheres of activity." This is the language of Edward J. Russell in discussing value and existence, but it fits in exactly with our discussion of personality. Let me add the testimony of Baillie:

> The search for intellectual truth is controlled by the same fundamental conditions as guide and determine the mind's activity in every other essential direction. In each and all the concrete individual is endeavoring at once to fulfil its being to the uttermost, and to become consciously alive to the world of beings which co-exist with itself, and these two processes are but aspects of its self-maintenance. No one direction of

the mind's life can be a substitute for, or supersede, even in importance, another, any more than in a higher organism one organ can really take the place of another organ. Perception does not make sensation any the less necessary; both are qualitatively distinct from memory and from judgment, as these are from each other; while again scientific or systematic knowledge is on as different a level of mental energy from all these mentioned as it is from the activity of the moral life, of art, or of religion. By each of these activities the individual mind attains a different level of being, acts or reacts upon its world in a new way, fulfils a distinct mode of its life and thereby establishes its own existence, in the face of a ceaselessly varying realm of objects.

No one of the directions carries the mind beyond the ambit of its own sphere of existence, since all subserve the fulfilment of man's being as a living individuality. If religion and art, if morality and technical adaptation to nature are essential modes of human life, forms of its expression, science and the pursuit of intellectual truth are equally so, and no more than particular manifestations of the mental energy of human beings, or rather of a restricted num-

> ber of individuals. And if memory, perception and imagination are but ways by which we apprehend the real, so as to conserve the stability and unity of our individual minds, conceptional activity, judgment, perform a similar function in precisely the same interest.[3]

This view of human experience is known as anthropomorphism. It is sometimes derided as the peculiar tendency of the primitive mind. But it is in truth a tendency that is a necessity of human thought. As we must breathe with our lungs, so we must think with our minds. "The mind can never transcend its conceptions so as to grasp things other than through its conceptions."[4] Our minds are the only instruments we possess. Indeed, anthropomorphism persists to-day even in the thinking of those who deride it. For what is it but anthropomorphism (of a peculiar kind, I admit, but still anthropomorphism) to ascribe human qualities such as design and reason and moral character to non-human beings, as is done by those who ascribe to nature design, and goodness, and righteousness, without being willing also to predicate a personality as the possessor of these qualities?

Perhaps I ought to call attention to the rela-

[3] *Studies in Human Nature,* by J. B. Baillie, pp. 20, 21.
[4] Borden P. Bowne.

tion of this dislike to personality in God to the Catholic doctrine on this subject. The Catholic doctrine of three persons and one God, is not so much that God is a person, as that personalism is found in God, which is, I suppose, only another way of saying that the Church theologians wished to ascribe to God all the qualities of personality without its limitations. So to God, as our Father, they gave personality; God as Redeemer, of course, had personality, and God as touching our spirits had personality, just as Mr. Bradley is willing to give personality to God. Yet in their unity as constituting the Godhead, these three create a kind of super-personality, just as Mr. Bradley makes his Absolute above personality.

I cannot here consider the doctrine of the Trinity. I admit frankly that I cannot regard the Nicene Creed as the final and unalterable statement of Christianity. It seems to me too intellectual, with too much of Platonism in it, and without sufficient recognition of other sides of our life. Augustine's analogy of the Trinity to reason, affection and will, seems to me to be justifiable in that stage of psychology, but no longer to be helpful, now that we realize that these so-called faculties are only different modes of operation of one indivisible personality. The Trinity such an analogy suggests to-day is a modal, Sabellian Trinity. In discussing defini-

tions or theories of this kind, we must remember that the meaning and not the form of statement is important. Let me take an illustration from an article of the Nicene Creed which will not excite controversy. I refer to the statement that the Holy Ghost "proceedeth from the Father and the Son." As everyone knows, in the Greek Church that article of the creed runs "proceedeth from the Father." While these are different statements, they are not contradictory: for each has a peculiar meaning. The meaning of the Greek statement is that the Greeks desire to assert the unity of the Godhead, which they think would be destroyed if there were two fountains of being, so they say, "proceedeth from the Father," with that meaning. The Latin Church, however, felt that the important point was to emphasize the full divinity of the Son, which in their judgment was imperiled if the Holy Ghost was not as closely related to Him as to the Father. So they added *filioque,* with that meaning. There ought to be no difficulty in saying either form, since in subjects of this kind meaning is everything. The same may be said of the doctrine of the Trinity in the Nicene Creed. Its phraseology is not the language that we should use to-day if we were constructing our doctrine of God, but it seems to me that its meaning is right, viz., that while there is in God personality, there is also more than

personality—that He must be both more closely unified than we with our warring impulses (*zwei Seelen wohnen ach! in meiner Brust*) and yet with additional powers and richer complexities in His nature than we can dream of, since He is ever developing in Nature richer and more numerous diversities and complexities.

More unified and more complex? There is no contradiction in that statement. A man is far more unified than a stone, which is only an aggregate of particles, more unified than a tree, which can be pierced and yet live. But a man is also infinitely more complex than stone or tree. Why may not the same be true of God, with greater distinctions in His nature, and yet with more intimate union? A God with personality and yet with other powers besides. This is the kind of God which our nature demands, and which reason, in the large sense, as distinguished from logic or understanding, indicates. Such a God, a God having personality, I reckon among the things that remain.

From various quarters the objection comes that the idea of a personal God is too anthropomorphistic. It will be worth while to ask just what is the meaning of this objection. Very frequently it is explained that man is too insignificant a creature in this vast universe, now that we know its immensity and longevity, to give any longer any

plausibility to the old idea that he himself is the measure of all things.

> It is a commonplace that physically and existentially man can but make a superficial and transient scratch upon the outermost rind of the world. It has become a cheap intellectual pastime to contrast the infinitesimal pettiness of man with the vastness of the stellar universe. Yet all such comparisons are illicit. We cannot compare existence and meaning, they are disparate. The characteristic life of man is itself the meaning of the vast stretches of existence, and without it the latter would have no value or significance. There is no measure of physical existence and conscious experience, because the latter is the only measure there is for the former. The significance of being is the emotion it stirs, the thought it sustains.[5]

In truth man must be the *mensura mensurans* —both the measurer and the measure, while thought continues to be thought. One of the great gains from Pragmatism, or Humanism as it is better named in this connection, is that it has shown that science and knowledge are all shot through with human values, that such valuations enter into logic as well as into ethical and

[5] Dewey, p. 538.

æsthetic questions. Why, then, this fierce objection to anthropomorphic religion, when, as Baillie puts it, "the various ends pursued by the human mind in its process toward self-discovery or self-fulfilment are one, and all, truth as well as goodness and beauty, anthropomorphic in origin and realization."

When we say anthropomorphic we do not mean merely subjective or invalid. As a part of reality, our place is well established. When our ends are achieved, they react on us, and establish our place in reality more firmly, and show themselves to be real. The crude anthropomorphisms of primitive ages are of course to be refined, as the crude logic of primitive man is refined and purified, but this is no proof that anthropomorphism itself is wrong; it is as essential to thought as logic itself, for we cannot think otherwise than as human beings. The anthropomorphistic statements of the Deity must be treated intelligently, with regard to their meaning rather than with anxious scrutiny of terms, as we speak of the bosom of the Eternal Father, the right hand of God, the everlasting arms. As a great philosopher has well said: "Meaning is wider in scope, as well as more precious in value, than is truth. Making such a statement is dangerous; it is easily misconceived to signify that truth is of no great importance under any circumstances; while the fact is that

truth is so infinitely important when it is important at all, namely, in records of events and descriptions of existences, that we extend its claims unduly. Meaning is a wider category: truths are but one class of meanings, namely, those in which a claim of verifiability by their consequences is an intrinsic part of their meaning." I would apologize for spending so much time upon this objection were it not that it is so frequently heard in quarters where one would expect more knowledge of the necessary conditions of human thought and of the part that human needs have played in building up science as well as religion and art. "We needs must love the highest," says Guinevere. Exactly, and we must needs liken God to the highest that we know in the scale of being and value, and that is to man, and endow Him with reason and will and affection, the nature that thinks and decides and loves; that is to say, personality—a personality as much superior to ours as His reason, will and love are greater than ours.

It may be expedient to consider in this connection the doctrine of the Absolute. I have been calling on philosophy to support the judgment of common sense and religious experience against the dissolving processes of materialistic science; not all science, you observe, but science in the hands of the materialists who have taken the

methods of science and constructed it into a philosophy. But in this doctrine of the personality of God, it may be claimed, philosophy is against me, and supporting science. For science, I frankly admit, has nothing to do with persons. Science ignores personality. The deeds of persons belong to history, their nature to philosophy. It is inevitable that science should not discover personality behind phenomena, because as soon as it takes up the study of such a phenomenon as man, it eliminates and disregards personality. What science is seeking for is general concepts, common properties, the common denominator that can go into all its numbers, and personality is peculiar, idiosyncratic; lying deeper than reason, it has qualities that are not reasonable, that belong to other realms than reason, such as taste, preference, bias, etc. In the great humanistic movement that is now molding thought this limitation of science is recognized, and efforts are being made to correct it. Medicine realizes that it has made a mistake in overlooking man's peculiarity as a thinking, feeling, willing animal, or in other words as a person, whose emotions and thoughts are potent influences on his body.

Personality has been proven by Humanism to play its part even in abstract thought. But just as there is a belated mechanistic science that still lingers on, in spite of biology and the Emergent

Evolutionists, so there are hold-overs in the field of philosophy. The doctrine of the Absolute as antagonistic to Personality is one of its legacies.

Far be it from me to deny that the Absolute has elements of value, that ought to be preserved. It makes God ultimate and supreme, no Demiurgos, or mere earth-maker or ruler of the realm of spirit, but the Spirit that moves all things, and is background as well as foreground of our thought. It emphasizes His immanence, and makes Him closer than breathing, nearer than hands and feet, and so fits in with the mystic experience. The peace and comfort that it gives through these affiliations are proofs that our nature "demands" this close relation to God. In so far, I believe in the Absolute. This is the meaning of the doctrine, in my mind. I accept the doctrine of God as the Absolute, according to Professor Borden P. Bowne, that splendid American philosopher. But as soon as the philosophers seek to interpret a doctrine, valuable with this specific meaning, into a statement of the essential nature of God, I shrink back. Are we qualified to discuss this? Have we the materials for judgment on this point?

About the nature of God, as revealed by his relation to us, we have a clue. This is the side that He turns to us; but are we qualified to speak about the other side? Arguments drawn from

the implications of definitions, such as that since every affirmation is a limitation of definition, therefore, of God, nothing can be said except that He is, unconditioned, infinite, outside of the limitations of time and space, and so forth, are not convincing. They remind one too much of the reasoning that so long disturbed the astronomical calculations of Kepler, that since the circle was the most perfect figure, therefore the orbits of the planets must be circular. They resemble Hegel's unlucky determination of the number of the planets by the laws of thought, before Leverier discovered Neptune. A juster analysis of intellect will show we are not qualified to define God in his essence, and must restrict ourselves to his manifestations. I do not think that the intellect requires us to climb the steep road taken in his *Critique of Pure Reason* by Kant, who, as Heine put it, attended only by his faithful Lampe, stormed heaven and put the garrison to the sword.

But even if this were the verdict of the Discursive Intellect, that would not be the end of the matter. For as Kant himself admitted in his *Treatise on the Practical Reason,* we have other lines of approach to this problem. The force of these other arguments is more adequately appreciated to-day, when the intuitions, and the mind's judgments of values, and the demands of

other departments or rather functions of our personality are more adequately recognized. If the idealist is right in arguing that a universe that is recognized and successfully handled as a system intelligible to thought must be an expression of mind, then Bergson is also right that the universe is also an outcome of purposeful life, of force and desire mysteriously blended.

There are conclusions to be drawn from the nature of life as well as from the nature of mind. Life is ever changing, either molding environment or adapting itself to environment; it is not static, but dynamic. In their highest manifestations both life and mind are associated with personality. The inference is to my mind inevitable, it is always made by common sense, viz., that they are all three combined in the Supreme Mind, the Fountain of Life. The qualities of mind must not be allowed to conceal those of life, nor the qualities of life be permitted to annul the qualities of mind. Somehow they coexist in us, and they must be assumed to coexist in God. Each will modify and refine the other, so to speak. Life will cure mind of the detachment and passivity Aristotle ascribed to perfect mind, and mind will add to life reason, and eliminate from our conception caprice and partiality.

I admit that the metaphysical conception of God secures values. It acts as the logical glue

that holds multiplicity together and makes it intelligible. It supports the Divine Immanence, if its affirmations are borne in mind. It brings out forcibly the elements in the full reality that go beyond personality. But in spite of the peace and strength that it gives some people to contemplate God as the All, the only Reality, in whom all things subsist, so that whatever is not according to His will or His character has no reality, I cannot accept such an Absolute as a sufficient characterization of the living God, the loving God, the God of religious experience, the God whom we can serve, and whose causes we can advance, to whom we can make our requests known with hope of a response. The Absolute is a Sun—of which you need make no request, you simply walk out into its rays and it lightens you. Here is no personal relation. The God of religion is a Friend who desires to have us make our requests, even though He may be able to read our minds, and who wishes us to cultivate His society.

Great minds have been able to combine these conceptions, e.g., St. Paul and St. Augustine. While I cannot combine them in reason, I believe that most of us combine them in practice. We hope they can be reconciled. Just as men going east continue in that direction, and ultimately meet men who started out in the exactly opposite

direction, because the world is spherical, so we hope that in God these apparent contradictions may be solved, and both values be preserved as we learn more of His nature by developing larger natures ourselves. Indeed, one of the more fundamental objections to the identification of God with the Absolute is that this is a conception that has the stamp of finality. One of the great marks of truth is fruitfulness in results and in new points of view. Now the Absolute, since it is never really known, like Kant's *Ding an Sich* (*Things in themselves*) and is merely the substance that supports all qualities, can never become better known. According to this theory, knowledge here reaches an impasse. Thus the theory is sterile, by its own admission. We may grow, the nature of man may widen and deepen, for there is no saying falser than that oft-quoted remark, so frequently heard on the lips of ultra-conservatives, that human nature does not change. In truth it is one of the most changeable, growing, developing things in the world. An old aristocrat in one of Mrs. Humphrey Ward's novels expresses it exactly when she says: "The trouble is not so much that the laws change; it lies deeper; we have changed, and have no longer the heart to assert our rights." Exactly so; human nature, being alive, is ever changing and adapting itself. How unnatural then is it to believe that this changing life is

encased in an unyielding armor, that the life that manifests itself in new forms is the product of an underlying changeless reality. This theory of the Absolute may result from certain narrow premises by the laws of logic, but it is certainly contrary to life. So far as it brings peace and strength, and makes us realize the immanence of God, I accept it for this meaning, but so far as it denies personality, I reject it. In the same way, so far as the ascription of personality to God meets our demand that the Creator should possess every endowment of the creature, and should be the Providence and Friend that our hearts desire, I accept it for this meaning; but so far as this attitude is used to exclude God from our inmost life, making Him exterior to us, or to limit His powers, then I reject it. In other words, the doctrine of God must be formed by adding together all the deep claims and demands of our nature, which we insist on having gratified. They are the clues, and each must be utilized. Incomplete, chaotic, undeveloped as we are, it is no wonder that we find it difficult to reconcile them. But need we wonder at this? We have not yet been able to explain the interaction of our own mind and body; that they influence one another we know, but how the material influences the spiritual, and the spiritual the material, has thus far proved an insoluble problem. For of course

it is no explanation simply to assert that one is the product of the other. That is simply to deny one of the opposite shores that are to be bridged. If there is no opposite shore, there is no need of a bridge, and if there is no matter, or no spirit, no explanation is necessary. With this inability to harmonize our own nature, intimately known as it is, we need not be much troubled about the difficulties of combining the attributes of God, as the all-sustaining, all-knowing, eternal, omnipresent, and almighty, with the God of religion, the Heavenly Father, who not only knows us, but also loves, sympathizes with and helps us.

Such Theism is, indeed, the solution of common sense, and I can but find it a corroboration of the trustworthiness of this reasoning, that unlike so much philosophy, e.g., Positivism preëminently, which is so flatly contradicted by its own conclusion, this conclusion is entirely in accord with our reasoning. For grant that the Creator is a Being who loves and cares for His creatures, and has made them so that they can both give Him affection and care for His love, then we should expect that He would give them in common sense a guide that would lead them to Him.

This is our deepest conviction and fundamental assumption. We do not distrust, like Croce, a philosophy that justifies the dicta of common sense. On the contrary, we feel instinctively that

the agreement is a confirmation of philosophy's arguments. Philosophy and common sense, each helping, steadying, guiding and enlightening the other: such a satisfactory result makes us believe that we are on the right path.

So much then for the doctrine of the Absolute, and of the Personality of God. In the next chapter we shall take up the doctrine of Inspiration.

CHAPTER V

INSPIRATION

It does not signify much to believe simply that God exists. As Mr. Gladstone pointed out in the great debate on the admittance of Bradlaugh to Parliament:

> The specific evil, the specific form of irreligion with which educated society has to contend, and be on its guard, is not blank atheism. That is a rare opinion very seldom met with: but what is frequently met with is that form of opinion which would teach us that whatever may be beyond the visible things of this world, whatever may be beyond this short span of life, you know, and can know, nothing of it, and that it is a bootless undertaking to attempt to establish relations with it.

To be of any value for life, religion must assert more than the existence and personality of God; it also asks whether He has any program which He wishes us to carry out, whether He has sent us any special messengers, and whether we can

in any way come into contact with Him. This latter question, whether we can hope to affect Him, I shall consider in the next chapter, on Providence. The subject of this present chapter is whether He has sent any special messages to us.

That some men are especially inspired of God has always been the belief of mankind. As ethics must consider all the moral conventions and judgments of the race, so must philosophy in its study of religion consider the manifestations of the religious life. It must consider religion concretely as well as abstractly. All of our great religions derive from some prophet or literature that claimed to be inspired, and was so accepted: from the Vedas, or the Old Testament, from a Moses, a Zoroaster, or Gautama, or Mohammed, or Jesus. What are we to think of these claims? They cannot be treated as empty boasts. From the teaching of these men and books flowed new energies. They proved their inspiring quality by awakening multitudes to new and higher aspirations. There must be real power behind such wonderful effects. The mystical raptures that they awoke in rare natures proved that they touched deep and hidden springs of feeling. But it is not to this mystical response that I am now referring, but to their influence on life in countless ways, their power to console, to help man to adjust himself to the pressure of life, to bear up under its injus-

tices, to control its excitements, to resist its temptations, and to endure its trials. In the view of this potency, what are we to think of the claim of inspiration? We certainly do not know enough about the universe to say that it is impossible. It is certainly not self-contradictory and opposed to the nature of our minds. That objection is absurd, since so many intelligent people have believed in inspiration.

Of course the idea of inspiration is perfectly absurd on the theory of the materialist. If there be no God, and all nature is a self-running mechanism—a mechanism self-repairing and self-propagating (which I may remark in passing is the kind of mechanism that none of us has ever had any experience of) then of course inspiration is preposterous and inconceivable. A philosophy that starts out with the determination to get rid of all theological implications cannot admit inspiration or revelation. So it was inevitable that Benedetto Croce should send the message to the Sixth International Congress of Philosophy at Cambridge in 1926, that "of revelation among philosophers and in a Congress of philosophers, and even among well-bred men who are respectful of other people's feelings there is no occasion to discuss." Wherever the Roman Catholic Church is dominant, as it is in Italy, philosophy is certain to have a strong anti-clerical bias. But the fallacy

of such dogmatism is manifest. It is simply the old trick: the clues are first eliminated from consideration, and then the solution to which they point is declared incredible and without evidence.

Whenever, however, Theism is accepted, and as we have seen, all philosophies except Positivism reach a Theistic explanation of the universe (a united testimony that is made much more valuable by the variety of roads by which they reach this goal), inspiration is a readily accepted explanation of the great literatures and teachers.

We have long outgrown the narrow dogmatism that pronounced such books as the Rig-Veda, the Zend Avesta, the Koran, blasphemous fables or lying impostures. We believe that through them God spoke in times past in divers manners.

To the Bible, we ascribe such inspiration preeminently. Not only is this the tradition of our race, to which we owe a respectful consideration, but it is also the dictum of common sense. Books may be divided into two classes—the literature of knowledge and the literature of power. In the latter class the Bible is preëminent, as ecclesiastical and secular tyrants have always realized. It is a Book that is stored with dynamite, in its teachings of the worth and destiny of man. Its message has been the means whereby men have acquired new powers by putting themselves as willing agents in the hands of God. Coleridge

spoke the judgment of common sense when he said, "I know the Bible is inspired, because it inspires me."

The great trouble is that when the word inspiration is used, people understand it to signify verbal inspiration. Now verbal inspiration is not inconceivable—a hypnotized person is inspired in that fashion by the hypnotizer. The old theologians thought that the inspired writers were inspired in that fashion, and were mere flutes through which the Eternal Spirit blew its melodies, mere pens in the hand of the Divine Writer. Such a theory is abstractly conceivable. But it is entirely inapplicable to the books of the Bible. When we come to study them apart from the theory of inspiration, which was borrowed from the Synagogue, and constructed for controversial purposes, so that the claim of Rome in behalf of the Infallible Church might be countered with the claim of the infallible Book; when we look at the books apart from such preconceptions and allow them to speak their own message, we discover that while they claim inspiration, they also disclose a mixture of the human and temporary with the Divine and Eternal. The prophets knew only in part, and when that which was more perfect came, that which was in part was done away. The law was a pedagogue to lead to Christ, and then was abrogated.

All that the Bible itself requires us to postulate to justify its claim to inspiration is that it should have the same kind of inspiration in religion that the great masterpieces exhibit in literature, art, or science. Everyone realizes that in art, literature and music, our progress has been due to the gifted leaders who have had a mysterious and superior insight into the nature of things. People have always looked on poets as uniquely inspired, and the great poets have felt themselves to be ambassadors of God in the realms of beauty and feeling, or to speak philosophically in the realm of values.

Now that Humanism has opened our eyes to the real processes of scientific discovery, and we appreciate that the analytical reason does not find out its theory as a cash receiver finds its proper receptacle, by a mechanical process of wheeling around till it comes to the right opening, but that there is a large element of prepossession and desire and creative imagination in constructing scientific theories, we can ascribe inspiration to scientific leaders and discerners also. Indeed, it seems to me this is the only rational explanation of their insights. Take for example Democritus, with his theory of atoms. Tyndall in his famous Belfast address traces the history of the atomic hypothesis down the centuries from Democritus and Lucretius to Bacon, Boyle and Newton.

While it met with changes, the substantial idea remained. Now how was it that Democritus devised such a hypothesis? What evidence had he for it? Nothing worth talking about. But could it have been merely a lucky guess? How improbable! Moreover, how was it that, inadequately justified as it was, it commended itself to so many men of supreme ability?

Is not this the most reasonable answer, that these men were rarely gifted spirits, especially equipped to discern the working of things—in short, that they were inspired, filled more than others, with the Spirit that guides all things? I might multiply instances of rare insight on the part of scientists, when theories formed on scant evidence have been proved to be correct. A striking instance is Boyle's hypothesis that in the conservation of matter, the substance of matter and the qualities of matter are inseparable. This, you will note, is just the opposite of the scholastic doctrine that the substance and the qualities or accidents are separable. The doctrine of Transubstantiation is an admirable example of the scholastic theory. According to that doctrine, the substance of the bread and wine is changed at consecration, but the accidents, or qualities, remain. The doctrine was readily believable when the prevailing philosophy taught that substances and properties are separable. For this scholastic

theory Boyle substituted just the opposite: substances and properties are inseparable; but substances are compounded of elementary kinds of matter, each kind with inseparable qualities, but with new qualities in new combinations.

This assumption is the basis of modern chemistry. Yet a great writer assures us that a company promoter who should issue a prospectus based on no better evidence than Boyle advanced for this tremendous theory would be in peril of the law. How are we to explain such a theory on such evidence? Newton and Faraday were especially fruitful of such brilliant ideas. Surely the world is right in considering these scientists not as mere calculating machines, but as men rarely gifted by God and uniquely filled with His mind.

No different inspiration need be claimed for the prophets of Israel. As the scientists and artists were uniquely qualified to understand nature and art, so were the prophets uniquely gifted morally and religiously. As these other thinkers rose from partial insight to larger visions, so with the religious prophets. Badly off should we be in science, music, art, literature, government, without our inspired leaders in these realms, without Archimedes, Galileo, Kepler, Newton, Faraday, Darwin, Pasteur; without Bach, Beethoven, Wagner, Brahms; without Leonardo, Michelangelo, Rem-

brandt and Velasquez; without Homer, Dante, Shakespeare, Milton and Goethe.

The race is not constituted so that it can make its way without leaders, pioneers, guides, teachers. People with only moderate gifts, who refuse to sit at the feet of these leaders are stupid and impossible.

In no department is this truer than in religion. From the very first it has had its priests and prophets. It has always depended on the creative, inspiring gifts of rare men. From the first it has been felt that the special problems of special occupations were so engrossing that men who could rise up above their special tasks, and take large surveys, and concern themselves with eternity, as well as time, and with the invisible, as well as the visible, were especial agents of the Invisible Powers.

Inspiration so understood does not imply infallibility. The prophet knew more than his fellows, and penetrated more deeply into the problem, but he did not know everything. The message need not be valid for all time to be recognized as inspired. It was enough that it should prove the right advice at that crisis, that it should lead the marchers in the path of deliverance from present perils. Another difficulty might call for other tactics. The order to tack, or ware, or shorten sail is not a standing order, but for the emergency.

So the Mosaic law was for mankind at that stage in its development, in the hardness of their hearts. The command to build altars was for childish days, and was superseded when men understood that God is a Spirit, and is correctly worshiped neither in Jerusalem or Gerizim, but wherever men adore Him in spirit and in truth.

This conception of inspiration may seem to some far short of our needs, but those needs are only the needs of a certain theory; it meets our practical requirements. And it is worth noting that it rids us of many difficulties. For example, it enables us to free ourselves of the bondage of such teachings as that Ham was for all time to serve his brethren, that women are made expressly for men and are inferior to them, that lending money on interest is wrong, that wine is a wholesome digester and a good exhilarator, that women must keep silent and not speak in public, that Christians must not go to law. We are delivered from the sophistry of seeking to reconcile manifest contradictions in the Bible. It loosens the cables that bind us to the Past, and enable us to use the Bible as a book of inspiration and not as a book of rules and laws.

It does not lessen the glory of these sacred books to make their superiority one of degree and not of kind, as it does not derogate from the glory of the sun to know that its combustion is the

same process and its light of the same kind as a tallow candle's. The sun is only made more comprehensible, and not a whit less marvelous by this theory.

The same holds good of the inspiration of the Bible. A supreme example of inspiration in the realm of religion, it is also a literature which is made more comprehensible when the true nature of inspiration is understood.

The rightful authority of the Bible is no whit lessened. Its nature is only explained. Its inspiration lies in the spirit, and not in the letter. He who knows has the right to our obedience, as long as it is a duty to act wisely. It is enough to establish the reasonableness of the doctrine that the Prophets and Apostles had unique insight into moral and spiritual truths, to establish their right to instruct us, and our duty to consider carefully their teachings.

Indeed, the Bible thus freed from its temporal elements, and making its appeal not to our comprehension of its words, but to our insight into its spirit, becomes a book which reveals its secrets only to the pure in heart, the spiritual, the earnest, the idealistic, and remains a closed book to the carping, skeptical, materialistic worldling. It is a touchstone.

The book, so understood, is infinitely more helpful than the Book as interpreted on the old the-

ory, when it was used to justify so many persecutions, cruelties, and oppressions. Shelley used the Bible in the old fashion when he portrays that monster Cenci, calling on God to stand by him against his injured daughter, since he is a father, and therefore must take a father's side in a controversy with a child.

Of course the supreme manifestation of inspiration is the teaching of Jesus. No explanation of His teaching in its extraordinary depth and elevation, in its influence and uniqueness, is so reasonable as the theory of inspiration—I mean of course to those who believe in Theism, and the spiritual nature of man.

I waive aside for the moment the theory of His Divinity. The fundamental point is His inspiration. Our faith in His Divinity rests upon our belief in His inspiration, and not the reverse. If He is the greatest of all the prophets, the prophet who has never been surpassed or equaled, more to religion than Hippocrates was to medicine, more than Homer was to poetry, more than Copernicus was to astronomy, more than Bach was to music, then it is absolutely necessary that we should sit at His feet. We must learn of Him. His Divinity is an explanation of this supreme inspiration. It has immense authority behind it, and contains immense values; but it seems to me that as a teacher it is enough that He should be

inspired, and should have taught us by His life and works, as well as by His words.

If we take the motives, ideals and attitude toward God that He enjoined, we are surely walking in His steps, following Him, and looking unto Jesus as the author and finisher of our faith. People who do this, though they may differ in the explanation of His inspiration, and their doctrine of His relation to God, are nevertheless followers of the Master. This is the truth that Dr. Fosdick has been teaching with supreme power. It is an all-important point. It is far more important to follow than to define. As W. T. Stead used to put it pithily, "Christian is as Christian does." When Helen Keller in her blindness felt the guiding hand of Miss Sullivan, the important point was that she should accept that hand's guidance, not that she should understand how it was that Miss Sullivan knew so much more than her pupil. Helen, blind and deaf as she was, could not appreciate what sight or hearing are, nor understand the difference between herself and Miss Sullivan. Miss Sullivan's endowments were beyond her imagining in that stage of her culture. What was essential for her to appreciate was that the natures of herself and her teacher were similar, their minds moving in obedience to the same laws and influenced by kindred emotions, so that she might safely infer, from her own mind, the

operations of Miss Sullivan's mind. It was on this theory of similarity that she reasoned in accepting Miss Sullivan's guidance. She found her confidence justified by results. Thus, long before she could appreciate in any degree Miss Sullivan's additional endowments, she had become her loving and obedient follower.

Surely that was the method of the early Christions; Jesus was first accepted, and afterward explained. The fundamental point was to accept His teachings.

The doctrine of the divinity of Jesus is His own explanation of His inspiration. He felt himself to be uniquely the Son of God. Other messengers He likens to the servants; He is the Son and heir.

When people say that they want the religion of Jesus, and not the religion about Jesus, it is worth noting that this faith in His own unique Sonship was part of His religion.

I shall speak of the considerations for and against miracles later, for it seems to me unworthy to discuss Christianity and the Gospels and waive aside the question of miracles. The omission of any such examination is the great and manifest defect of Streeter's noble book, *Reality*. But whatever part miracles may have played in the first century, certainly, to-day, after all these centuries, the chief reason for considering Jesus is not the miracles, but the teachings.

The doctrine of the Divinity of Jesus, however, rests on something deeper even than His words, and that is on the principle that the Highest must necessarily be the supreme manifestation of the Creator. We needs must look on a Supreme Character, as the supreme manifestation of God. Indeed, that is the chief importance of such a character to us. At its core religion is an effort to get into harmony with the universe by linking ourselves in loyalty and obedience to the Spirit that rules the universe. Nothing will satisfy its demand but union with God.

It is because it was believed God was in Christ, reconciling the world to Himself, that men came to Jesus. This awoke the loving gratitude of Paul. In the degree that this glory of Christ, as the manifestation of God, became clearer and clearer, the Christology of the New Testament steadily mounted from "Jesus of Nazareth, a man approved of God by signs and wonders, whom God hath made Lord and Christ," in the early chapters of Acts, to Paul's doctrine of Jesus, the image of the invisible God, to the teaching of the Fourth Gospel, in which Jesus is identified with the Divine Logos.

Gibbon's well-known gibe, that the doctrine of the Logos said to be revealed in the Gospel of St. John, had been worked out before by Plato and Philo, loses all its point if we understand

that the Early Christian teachers were simply using the thought forms of their day to express this fundamental truth that in worshiping Jesus, they were not placing any creature, however holy or lovable, between themselves and God, that it was the God in Christ whom they worshiped, and that the God whom they worshiped in Christ was the same being as the God who made heaven and earth.

It is the merit of the Church's doctrine of the Divinity of Christ, which is a compound of these Biblical teachings and of Greek philosophy, that it endeavors to preserve the humanity of Jesus, and also to meet our need of contact with God, "and not another." Arius was on the wrong track. Mankind will never be satisfied with a Demiurgos. The religion of Jesus must bring us into contact with the Father in Heaven, to whom He taught us to pray.

This is the meaning that the Divinity of Jesus is meant to convey. This is the practical purpose of the doctrine, and of such teaching as the great saying in the Fourth Gospel, "He that hath seen me, hath seen the Father."

We miss the entire point in such doctrines as the Divinity of Jesus, and its scholium, the doctrine of the Trinity, if we emphasize the terms, and ignore the purpose of the doctrine, the value that it seeks to conserve.

Those early theologians failed to realize the inadequacy of their terms to do more than hint or symbolize the reality. The way that they treat the word "proceedeth," as applied to the Holy Ghost, shocks us. The Divine Spirit we believe in is not the Spirit of the Nicene Creed's definition, but the Spirit whose movings we experience in our hearts. The Christ that we know is not the Christ of the Council of Chalcedon, but the Christ of the Gospels, full of grace and truth. The Catholic doctrine of the Trinity is a marvelous doctrine, and conserves great values. I reverence it as a great shrine of devotion and a marvel of theological construction. It stresses the important truths that God is one, however various His manifestations, that the Spirit who holds together all things is in an ineffable degree inwardly united, and is also infinitely more complex than we, possessing qualities and gifts that pass our comprehension.

But while I make this acknowledgment, I am also compelled to add that it is doubtful whether the elaborate statement of the Nicene Creed is especially helpful to-day. Even Calvin, systematic theologian that he was, said that it was enough for the Christian to believe that God was manifest in Creation, Redemption and Sanctification. This seems to be the teaching of our Church and Catechism, when it asks, "What dost thou

chiefly learn in these Articles of thy Belief?" and puts the answer in the child's mouth:

"First, I learn to believe in God the Father, who hath made me and all the world.

"Secondly, in God the Son, who hath redeemed me and all mankind.

"Thirdly, in God the Holy Ghost, who sanctifieth me and all the people of God."

This is the Trinity of the Scriptures, and the Trinity of Experience. This Trinity, I am confident, will abide. It expresses enduring value.

But that other Trinity, into whose explanation and definition so much of Greek Philosophy has entered, shows signs of having served its purpose. It is hard to teach it without leaving the ignorant under the impression that we are under a Committee, an almighty Board of Trustees.

Such reasoning as the popular argument that the loving nature of God requires the postulation of the doctrine of the Trinity, since eternal Love must have an eternal object of love, the Eternal Father necessitating an Eternal Son, is like the doctrine which so long misled Kepler, that the planets must be assumed to revolve in circles, since God as the most perfect Being must make these orbs revolve in the most perfect of figures. We have outgrown such logic. This dogmatism and cocksureness, where an altar to the mys-

tery of Godhead would be more suitable, is offensive to modern reverence.

Lotze puts the case admirably in the *Microcosmos:*

> When Christian theology calls Christ the Son of God, it gives expression, no doubt, to the most distinctive article of its belief; but it does this in a figure, the exact significance of which it can by no means determine. What this phrase expresses and what is meant to be believed is clearer to the believing soul without, rather than with, the dogmatic determinations that have been attached to it. For the figure taken simply indicates the intimate nature of the relation between God and Christ which is clear to feeling, though all adequate knowledge of it is impossible for us. *Indeed the moral supremacy of Jesus makes it necessary to ascribe to Him Divinity.*[1] No glory of Christ derived from a metaphysical, superlatively supernatural relation to God, can be equal to the moral majesty of His life and death for the redemption of the world, to His moral union with God in doing His will by the death on the cross.

The Protestant world is moving away from the metaphysical Trinity to the Trinity of Experience,

[1] Italics mine.

and the tendency is wholesome. It is important that the doctrine should be simplified, because we are no longer living in a philosophical era, and it is not expedient to present Christianity in terms of Greek philosophy. As far as possible, we should present the gospel in terms of our own age. What value would be lost if Jesus were depicted as standing to us in the relation of Miss Sullivan to Helen Keller, of our nature, yet with superior gifts, in closer relation with the Supreme Reality than we, so that He would serve as the door to bring us into Reality, or to speak more religiously, to reveal God to us, to bring us to God. The Catholic doctrine is so far removed from the modes of thought of modern people that instead of helping them to understand the gospel it confuses them. They find the gospel simpler than the explanation.

Moreover, the metaphysical Trinity supplies a basis for sacramental theories which to most modern-minded people appear magical and non-moral, which are based not on Biblical teaching, but are foisted into Biblical language, and which have their real source in the mystery religions of the East. Worst of all, being no longer modes of thought natural to us as they were to the Greek, an immense amount of time is spent in teaching these metaphysical explanations, justifying them, defending and explaining them, that

should be occupied in applying the principles of Christianity to the fields where Christianity has never made itself sufficiently felt. In the Middle Ages the Christian Church imposed nominally Christian standards on all departments of life. Its power, however, was that of an external authority. Its power was legal, and belief was chiefly assent to authority. Conduct was obedience to rule, and not the product of the Spirit of Life. It was a legal era, though nominally teaching the gospel. Our task is higher and harder, it is to make faith personal and heroic, a great venture of courage and idealism. Guidance is now to be found not in a code, but in a spirit of kindness, brotherliness, and service. In this task we shall be greatly helped, if we reduce our doctrinal baggage and express our religion in the simple terms of our inspired books. Part of that inspiration is their natural method, as well as their healing and uplifting message. Where the spirit of the Lord is, there is not only liberty; there is also guidance and power to mold the future.

> Thoughtful sensitiveness of conscience in treating all the concerns of life (that most wholesome fruit which living Christianity has produced in many souls) will be recognized as greater than the temper of mind, which turns away from all that is greatest and best

in modern civilization on the ground that it is secular, and turns its attention to definitions, and questions of words, to matters inscrutable, useless and archaic, often offending taste and moral sensibility in so doing, as when it exalts blood as a means of salvation and putting a stumbling block in the way of rational faith.[2]

[2] Lotze.

CHAPTER VI

PROVIDENCE

Logically the doctrine of Providence ought to be discussed before the theory of inspiration is broached, for Inspiration assumes a God intervening in the sequences of nature by raising up uniquely gifted men. I have reversed the order because there is practical agreement about inspiration among religious people, while there has grown up recently in certain circles, in the reaction against Calvinism, a shrinking from the doctrine of Providence, or if not a shrinking from the abstract doctrine, certainly a hesitation about making any practical use of it, as a source of consolation in adversity, or support under difficulties. So it seemed wise to establish first the doctrine of Inspiration, and then to take up the doctrine of Providence and to discuss its tenability with the advantage of the testimony of uniquely gifted men, using their testimony to show that the demand for such a theory of God's relation to the universe is not a morbid craving of weak and sentimental natures, but is the instinctive conviction

of the strongest, bravest and most spiritually gifted members of our race.

Logically, people who accept certain leaders as inspired, who explain their special endowments as extraordinary manifestations of the Divine, have made a pretty close approach to the doctrine of Providence—of a God who is guiding the race, and bringing in the "fullness of time" the messenger with the needed message. They may imagine that in their reliance upon teaching as the supreme attestation of the messenger, they have risen into a lofty region of universal truth, and escaped from sordid particulars and such primitive conceptions as special providences, and miraculous manifestations. But they have simply failed to examine exhaustively their own mental processes. Inspired men are none the less miracles and wonders, because they appear in the moral realm. They are inexplicable by their antecedents and environment. Those who acclaim them as inspired thereby assert their belief that God specially raised them up. Inspiration is an assertion of special Providence in those cases. After this admission the only question is not whether there is any such thing as a special Providence, but how far this theory is to be carried, and whether it applies to the lives of ordinary people. When one considers how marvelously events are interrelated, it is difficult to see how

we can restrict God's care of the universe to a few persons; how, for example, He can have raised up Moses and guided his parents to float him in his ark of bulrushes on the Nile, but have had nothing to do with Pharaoh's daughter's visit to the river and her compassion on the babe; how He can have led Jesus into the wilderness, and incited Him to speak in the synagogue and heal diseases, and had nothing to do with shaping the careers of Peter and John, and also of Annas and Caiaphas, and of the Roman rulers, of Pompey and Cæsar, of Octavius, and Antony and Herod, and of the events that brought the Roman punishment of crucifixion to Palestine, and set a Roman procurator where Jewish kings once ruled.

If we find that logically there can be no halfway house, and if we believe that God specially endowed Jesus, and sent Him upon a career that was Divinely planned, we must be prepared to believe that God specially endows each one of us, and has for our lives also a special task.

The alternatives were well stated by Marcus Aurelius: "The world is either a welter of alternate combination and dispersion, or a unity of order and providence. If the former, why do I care about anything else than how I shall at last become earth? But on the other alternative, I feel reverence, I stand steadfast, I find heart in the power that disposes all."

The question is whether in this day of science and renewed interest in Philosophy we can believe any longer this ancient theory of Providence, this theory that God is so related to the universe that nothing in it happens without His permission, and all things in it are so controlled by Him that mankind is being by Him educated and guided to some selected and predetermined goal. Is such a view consistent with our belief in the freedom of the Human Will? Would a God who sustained such a relation to the universe, and permitted such murders, rapes, and bestialities, wars, cruelties and oppressions as go on upon this planet be a Moral Being and entitled to our worship and loyalty? That's the question. Let us face it fairly.

I admit, at once, that the presence of sin makes the problem difficult. It is not without a spiritual effort that we believe that God rules, when we consider the prosperity of the wicked and the sufferings of the meek and innocent. But this difficulty cannot be restricted to Divine Providence; it must also be carried back to the Divine Existence. The truth is, if anyone had an interest in maintaining the opposite hypothesis of unwisdom and evil in the world-ground, a great deal might be said for it. The great mass of apparent insignificance, and all the facts of evil with which life is crowded would lend themselves only too

readily to such a view. A purely objective procedure would demand that we take all the facts into account, and strike the average. Such a study of the facts would leave us in great uncertainty. Over against the good in nature we should put the evil; and this would hinder the affirmation of goodness. But over against the evil in nature we should put the good; and this would not allow us to affirm a fundamental malignity. Over against the wisdom in nature we should put the meaningless aspects of existence, the cosmic labor which seems to end in nothing; and these would leave us doubtful whether we were not contemplating the world of some blind Demiurge rather than of supreme wisdom. But over against these facts we should put the ever-growing rational wonder of the universe, and this would drive us to doubt again. The outcome would probably be the affirmation of a being either morally indifferent or morally imperfect, or morally good but limited by some insuperable necessity, which forbids anything better than our rather shabby universe.

> But [to quote Borden P. Bowne, a philosopher whose fame is in my judgment certain to grow] the mind is not satisfied to take this road. It will not allow its ideals to collapse without some effort to save them. It prefers rather to maintain its faith in the ideal, and to set aside the conflicting facts as something

not yet understood, but which to perfect insight would fall into harmony. This assumption is made both in the cognitive and the moral realm, in reference to God's wisdom as well as to his goodness, and so far as logic goes, it is as well founded in one realm as the other. In both cases our procedure is not due to logical compulsion; it is rather an act of instinctive self-defense on the part of the mind whereby it seeks to save its life from destruction.

We feel instinctively that life is worth while (this is the judgment of the race) and we infer that the source of this worth-while gift must be good. So we cling to the goodness of God in spite of the evil in the universe, and find it reasonable, in view of our restricted powers and brief experience, that His ways should be past our finding out. So logic builds on a basis laid by instinct. In obedience to instinct we seek in the universe not merely a First Cause, but also an object of adoration, to whom we can look up; a source of authority, to whom we can render obedience and service, of helpfulness to whom we can turn for aid, of clemency in whom we find forgiveness, of friendship in whom we can find the Great Companion. In short we yearn for a Providence who will sympathize and help us, and will not permit the universe to crush us, but has created it as a

vast womb in which to nurture us for a higher and greater life.

The Mechanistic view of the universe fails to satisfy this demand, to recognize this instinct, and we reject it. Our moral judgments and our devotional instincts on that theory are delusions and unmeaning excrescences, whereas we are convinced that they are the glories of our race; that Huss dying bravely, with gentle pity for the Sancta Simplicitas of the woman who was gathering sticks to throw on his pyre, that Socrates drinking the hemlock, and Jesus journeying to be crucified were acting wisely as well as heroically. The doctrine of Providence preserves these values.

It is not necessary, according to this doctrine, that God should always grant our prayers. His purposes may best be fulfilled by their denial. He has many beings dependent on Him, and must consult the good of the whole. But if He is to be the Providence of the Bible, and the Providence that our devotional instincts demand, He must be so in control of the universe that nothing can happpen without His permission, or that will permanently thwart His purpose. When the universe grinds a man to pieces, his sufferings must not be fruitless and purposeless.

The doctrine of the Immanence of God makes such a belief in Providence easier. But that is not the point at issue at this stage of the discus-

sion. What I am now emphasizing is that the religious instincts clamor for a God, who is the molder of the universe, the ruler of men's lives and destinies, and will not be satisfied with a God limited in His love and care by a mechanical universe. My fundamental assumption is that the religious instincts bring us authentic tidings of invisible things, that no history of the processes whereby they have grown up either in the individual or in the race can invalidate them, any more than analysis of the growth of our idea of number can invalidate mathematics. The validity of these instincts can no more be explained away by psychology than mathematics can be explained away by dissecting our brains. These judgments of value are here in the universe, and if the universe is to be interpreted in terms of reason, they must have some reasonable explanation. As Bradley puts it pithily: "The ideas which best express our highest religious needs, and their *satisfactions* (mark that word) must certainly be true." Or again more qualifiedly, but with equal certainty: "Whatever ideas really are required in practice by the highest religion are true. In my judgment their truth is not contradicted by metaphysics, so long only as they will not offer themselves as satisfying our last intellectual demands. And exactly how religious truths are in the end to be supplemented and

corrected, I would repeat that as I understand the matter, metaphysics cannot say." Thus while Bradley recognizes around us an ocean of mystery, he anchors in this harbor: spiritual values are real, and the universe must be interpreted in terms that will conserve them; they are clues to the nature of reality. In sooth they are ultimate clues, for as Bradley well says elsewhere: "We can see at once that there is nothing more real than what counts in religion. To compare facts such as these (religious experiences) with what comes to us in outward existence would be to trifle with the subject. The man who demands a reality more solid than that of the religious consciousness knows not what he seeks."

The spiritual values that are connected with a belief in Providence are faith in our Father's leading, confidence that our Father will not allow us to be tempted beyond what we are able to bear, loyalty in defeat, humility in prosperity, reliance on the Father's care. Someone may say all these qualities may be retained, in superior minds, without any belief in a God who will interfere with the course of nature in behalf of His people, or in answer to our prayers. My answer is that this is mere assertion. Practical experience shows that when people accept that view of the relation of God to the universe, they stop praying. Since such a God is out of touch with things, they feel

little interest in keeping in touch with Him. Of what value is a belief in some sort of a God?

Moreover, I cannot admit that such a limited faith can nourish the finest religious spirits. The great inspired leaders had no such view of God. They believed largely and passionately. To them God was the soul of the universe, which "has no laws of its own which can oppose a bar to the Divine Purpose, since all its laws and on-goings are but the expression of that purpose." Everyone admits that this was the teaching of the Old Testament prophets. The instances, like the One hundred and fourth Psalm, are too numerous for citation. The same is equally true of the New Testament, and of the supreme Teacher of that Book, the most exalted spiritual nature this world has ever known. We hear much of the religion of Jesus in contradistinction to the religion about Jesus. Let it be noted that this belief in a Providence who controls things animate and inanimate nourished the piety of Jesus. When tempted to take a shortcut to preserve His life and prove His Messiahship, He relied on the Divine provision. He was confident that the universe is so run that those who seek first the Kingdom of God and His righteousness are blessed. Our Heavenly Father knoweth of our bodily needs, and can and will provide for them as He cares for the plants and animals. When evil and injustice

came upon Him, He did not cry aloud, "I am sure that my Heavenly Father does not expect me to take such things as part of His plan." On the contrary, He said to His enemy, "Thou couldst have no power against Me, except it were given thee from above." He nerved himself for the last agony by the conviction, "For this end came I into the world." "If this cup may not pass from me except I drink it, Thy will be done." Here, then, we have a nature of the highest spiritual value sustained by a belief in a Divine Providence that orders all things, permitting the evil-doers to do only such things as He can overrule to His own ultimate ends.

When people talk about the religion of Jesus, and tell us in His name to play the game, or "accept things as they are," and take our share of the lot of humanity, they are substituting a stone for the bread of life, iron necessity for the Father's will. Such stoicism has a certain nobility, but it is not the religion of Jesus, and its proud self-sufficiency is not His filial trust in a Father's love. Let us take His religion in its fullness if we call him Master.

It is unnecessary to point out that the whole devotional life of the Church is based on the thought that God is the Protector and Guide of His people, making all things work together for their good. If this belief is abandoned, I do not

see how the spiritual values of resignation in sorrow, humility in success, and filial walking with God can be maintained. This is my main ground for believing in it. In essence it is the same kind of argument on which we base our belief in the existence of God: As reason, conscience, emotion and the totality of our natures call for God, the Creator, so the totality of our powers, and especially our devotional instincts call for God, the Preserver and Ruler of the universe. Our religious needs are as imperative as our intellectual needs.

But someone may object: "You don't really believe anything so old-fashioned and behind the times as special providences." I answer that some people are so anxious not to fall behind the age that they miss the lessons of the ages. What we are seeking is not the prevalent modes of thought, but enduring truths. I am quite aware that some people are trying to teach a religion without Providence in any efficient sense. It is an interesting experiment. I notice that it does not attract many people into the churches. Time will show the futility of such theories. As flowers may live for a season without rain, sustained by the water stored up in the soil, but will wither and die if the drought continue long, so Christian morality may continue for a time without the Christian doctrine of God. But it will not be long before decay will begin. The soldier of duty

will grow weary of standing at a post which no commander ordered him to occupy.

No one can worship the universe, or feel bound in loyalty to the universe. Strauss indeed tried to cultivate that temper. He asserted that the universe was a vast machine that took no cognizance of man and his spiritual needs and ultimately crushed him remorselessly; still he said it was our duty to reverence it. But Von Hartman expressed the judgment of our moral instincts when he pronounced misplaced and unethical such adoration of things as they are. What spiritual value is there in the worship of a machine or of a mass of things? Such a religion fails to nourish the spiritual values, whose preservation is the meaning and end of religion.

The moral values really control. What many people take for the logical march of thought is usually a modification or enrichment of thought brought about by instincts vivified by some deeper experiences. The Deistic theory of an absentee God was not overthrown by mere logical analysis. It had been rejected by people of lively faith before it was discredited in the schools. The nearness of God to his creatures is one of the primal verities that shine aloft like stars.

In truth the modern view of God as immanent, which at first glance seems more consistent with Providence, is not really so, if we take logic alone

as our guide, and do not supplement its teachings by the demands of our spiritual nature. An immanent God will be no more helpful than the absentee God of Deism, if He is frozen up in the universe, and sequences of things are the expressions of His nature, and not the movements of His will. For if the universe is the outcome of the Divine nature, it follows, since God cannot violate His own nature which is holy, just and good, that all deviations from its regular sequences would be deteriorations. We cannot ask God to go against His own nature and do wrong. Prayer for deliverance from physical ills on such a theory is impiety. All that we can ask for is submission. I have heard some hints that this is a superior form of piety. We have, however, seen it is not the piety of Jesus. Essentially it is the adoration of Strauss; the only difference being that in one case the object of adoration is a devouring machine, and in the other a destroying Spirit. The philosophical defect in such a view of God is that it fails to realize that just as man cannot be moral unless he is free, neither can morality be ascribed to God unless He also is free. He must be over nature as well as in it, transcendent as well as immanent. The universe must be the Expression of His will, so that nothing can exist apart from His will, and there can be no conceivable barriers in nature to the carrying out of His

purpose. This is a view of God in which we will all agree. But the point to be emphasized is that the real basis upon which logic has built it up is the necessity of preserving moral and spiritual values.

It is an essential deduction from such a theory of Providence that the whole history of the race must be looked on as the unfolding and realization of the purpose of this Divine Being. We cannot, indeed, trace this purpose in all the details of history, and when we begin to make specific interpretations, we are apt to go astray. But the existence of such a purpose is a necessary implication of this theistic faith. Sometimes the historical crises are such, and the co-working of complex factors so marked that we seem aware of a Divinity that shapes our ends. Then we speak of a guiding or overruling Providence. But it is clear that the only difference is that at some times the Divine purpose seems manifest, while at other times it is hidden. The purpose, however, is equally real and controlling at all times, though not equally manifest.

Someone may say, indeed, that such a belief of God in history is of course quite philosophical, but that the belief in special providences does not stand on the same basis, and has properly been looked upon as a mark of fanaticism. But I do not see how any distinction can be made. The

universe is one—the whole cannot be guided if the parts are not controlled. There is no such being as *Mankind,* who is to be guided, while individual men go their way. All existences are concrete. If there is to be any Providence at all, it must mold concrete lives and show itself in molding and guiding individuals. I hold therefore that instinct is right in inciting us to make our physical wants known to God. The universe is one. How can upholders of the Divine Immanence teach that physical phenomena are outside of God's control? The objection to prayers for rain, if there is any valid objection, cannot be that God cannot alter the course of nature. The whole universe is as open to His will as a fisherman's net is to the waves of the ocean. The real doubt about such prayers is whether they are not selfish, considering all the countless interests involved. God will not answer unrighteous prayers, or prayers of selfishness and self-seeking.

An intelligent child would not ask his father to stop the steamship of which he was the captain to gratify some personal whim. The father could stop the ship, but a wise captain would certainly both disregard and be offended by such a selfish request. The emphasis both of reason and of the Scriptures is that we may make our wants known unto God, but only do so in the right spirit, when our petitions are offered in submission to His

higher wisdom and in the faith that love and wisdom may for reasons inscrutable to us, deny our requests.

But enough of theology, let us turn to science. Can we hold to special providences in an age of science, when we have been taught the majesty of law, and the indissolubility of the connection of cause and effect? What does science think of providences?

I answer that science quite properly objects to this doctrine in its sphere, and will have nothing to do with it. It is as much out of place in a scientific investigation as it would be out of place to answer a lady who inquired why the captain of a steamship did not keep an engagement with her, by telling her that the captain's movements had as their ultimate end the arrival at a certain port, and that his presence on the ship was due to his employers. The lady would not care a fig for such matters and would regard the answer as stupid and unenlightening. She is concerned with a simple phenomenon, the captain's presence on the bridge and absence from her side, and its explanation. She moves in the realm of proximate causes.

Similarly the scientist is not interested in origins, or ultimate ends. He is occupied with phenomena and their proximate causes. He no more takes account of God, as a scientist, than arith-

metic or algebra take account of God. He ignores God, as the multiplication table and geometry ignore him. In exactly the same way science ignores personality in man. In the chapter on miracles I shall have something to say about the uniformity of nature, and the assumed inexorableness of its sequences. It is enough to say here that under the influence of biology this uniformity of nature is giving place to a doctrine of Emergent Evolution, and that the universe is now regarded by many scientists as a growing organism, capable of developing, like an adolescent, unexpected powers. Indeed, Professor Bohr has claimed that the great principles of the conservation of energy and of mass are not true in the interior of the atom, and are only true in the sphere in which they were discovered, and we are assured by high authority that by courageously accepting this break in the uniformity of nature, physics and chemistry have made the most wonderful advances in the past fifteen years.

But enough of science; it has really no voice in the matter.

With philosophy the case is quite different. Like Lord Bacon, it takes all knowledge for its province. It seeks to understand things in their totality, and to penetrate behind the phenomenal to the real. For a time this noble study has been eclipsed by the moon of science, but its sun

is emerging. For Pupin is, of course, entirely mistaken in implying that he has gotten his new vision of religion entirely by the help of science without any aid from philosophy. The moral cannot be deduced from the non-moral, and a philosophy cannot be developed out of a science, without the aid of philosophy. Some philosophical re-agent has to be added to the scientific facts to secure the philosophical conclusion.

Now philosophy reports nature as a system in which volitional causes are interpolated among natural causes. It appreciates that the universe is capable of receiving impulses from agents within it. If it were otherwise, and were rigid and inflexible, there would be absolutely no room for volition. As we know it, nature is a system that is perpetually taking on modifications which are not the results of the antecedent states of the system, but which have their source in human volition. Since these human agents are free, they may depart from the ideal order. If, therefore, the ideal order is to be finally attained, it may be necessary to meet these departures by changes which are not the consequent of the antecedent states, but which have their origin in the Divine Mind. A system that can accept into itself human volitions must logically be able to accept Divine volitions. Such effects would involve in the case of the Divine volitions, as in the case

of human volitions, no general suspension of natural laws nor even a break in phenomenal continuity. They would arise apparently as the result of familiar natural processes, though really rooted in a special divine interposition. A wind might suddenly change, the temperature alter, a sudden vitality manifest itself in the patient, an indispensable leader fall sick, a dispatch miscarry, an unexpected meeting bring two alienated people together in a mood favorable to reconciliation.

This general conception of interpolated causes has been stoutly opposed. It is, I admit, inconsistent with the Deistic conception of an absentee God running a machine world through the enginery of second causes, or with a Pantheistic God, whose nature is expressed in the natural sequences, and who could not go against His own nature. But it is entirely congruent with the Christian view of a Transcendent and Immanent God, who possesses personality. It seems permissible to hold that what is possible with men may be possible with God. In this theory we have God guiding history and guiding individuals. The theory is clearly logical. The question whether it be a reality is another matter. But as Bowne well says, "If there be any reason for affirming it, speculation has no valid objection."

Of course these interpolations will not be so

frequent or of such a character that they will destroy that measure of regularity and uniformity to Nature that is necessary if reason is to exercise its proper function in our lives. This modifying activity of God, we may therefore reasonably infer, will find its chief field in the inner life, and here not in the way of using the spirit as a passive instrument, but rather by priming it with special incitements to activity which neither the outer world nor the mental mechanism (so to speak) provides, this directing activity taking place without any apparent inception from without and without destroying the apparent continuity of psychological law.

But someone may object, why speak of interpolations, when all the universe is constantly being created? Does not such a term imply a transcendent God, and not an immanent God?

I answer, No. I am immanent in my body, yet I can interpolate my will in its movements, check its breathing and move its limbs. I also dominate and transcend my body. Still there are limits to my control over my body, and the question will arise, whether there are not also limits to the extent to which God will interpolate His will amid the natural sequences. To me it seems plain that some limit to God's activity is implied in the distinction between creation and preservation. It is hard to define it, I admit. The iden-

tity of conservation with perpetual creation is manageable when applied to the physical system. Here energy and sequence are the only fixed elements we can find, and science now unites with metaphysics in doubting whether there are any others. In that view the physical order is simply a process which exists only in its perpetual on-going. It has the identity of a musical note, and like such a note it exists only on condition of being incessantly and continuously reproduced. It is a vast moving picture that would cease if the light did not continue to pour out through the films. It is a cascade, ever being created anew.

But it seems impossible to apply this view to a world of spirits. We know with the highest degree of certainty with which we know anything, that our experiences are linked together by a mysterious causal process in which we ourselves have a conscious part. However it may be with the rocks and trees, we have an irresistible conviction that we are existences, and not mere phenomena. We have a measure of selfhood and self-control. This fact constitutes our claim to be considered realities. On the other hand we are forced to admit that we are dependent beings, dependent upon some absolute life. How these two facts coexist is perhaps the deepest mystery of speculation.

I mention it here, because it is this peculiarity

of man, as a partially independent existence, with a will of his own, that makes us speak of God as a governor. Properly we speak of government only where there are beings which by a certain independence threaten to withdraw themselves from the general plan which the ruler aims to realize. A musician plays the organ, but rules his choir. The proper subjects of a Divine government are spirits, since only these have that relative independence even against God which the idea of government demands.

But here we are back in the world of common sense, a world that acknowledges a Supreme Being, originating all things, and selecting the goal of all things, but allowing a certain amount of freedom to His intelligent creatures. In such a scheme many things must happen that are not according to the will of the Supreme Being, and certainly the Christian world admits this freely since its theology teaches that man is a sinful being, who has erred and strayed from the paths of right. But someone may object, how is it possible in such a mixed scheme to say that the evils that befall men happen to them according to the will of God, when so many of them happen from the sin of man? How can we say that God took the child home when the little one was run over by a drunken automobilist, or was slaughtered by a human brute. How can we say that sickness is

a Divine discipline when a lovely woman was infected with syphilis by a debauchee? All these things befall humanity. They certainly do not happen according to the will of God. So what becomes of your doctrine of Providence? It is incredible.

Now I admit that these are difficult cases. I do not expect to prove the Providence of God by arguments stronger than those by which I prove the existence of God. All the arguments for the existence of God call for a determination on our part to accept no view of the universe that is not reasonable, and that does not meet the demands of our entire personality, and that is not fruitful. So we predicate a righteous loving, wise, powerful God, in spite of sin and suffering in His creation.

Why can we not reason in the same way with regard to Providence? While God does not originate these evils, I admit that He permits them to originate, and allows these injustices to be inflicted on others. Both the sin of the wicked and the suffering of the innocent are part, in a sense, of His Divine Plan. Still, we may blame the evil-doer, and nevertheless accept the evil as a divine discipline. Don't say that this is inconceivable. Isn't this the spirit in which a boy, sent away to boarding-school, accepts its harsh bullyings and cruel teasings? He says, my father would be angry with these cruel tormentors, but

I must not rush to the Headmaster with whinings and complainings; it was that I might take care of myself and endure manfully and victoriously such experiences that my father sent me here. So he would accept the injustices as disciplines, intended by his father.

This is the way in which Jesus accepted the opposition of the Scribes, Pharisees and Roman ruler. They were the wicked husbandmen, rejecting and killing the Son. They were the agents of the powers of darkness. Yet at the same time, this suffering was the end for which He came into the world. The cross was the appointed means whereby, being lifted up, He should draw all men unto Him. This agony was not merely a fearful cruelty, a base treachery, an awful exhibition of unscrupulosity and ambition on the part of rulers, of ingratitude on the part of the multitude, of cowardice on the part of His followers, of callousness on the part of the mocking soldiers, it was also the cup that the Father had given Him to drink; it was also the means whereby God was reconciling the world unto Himself.

I do not deny that there have been heroes who have borne adversity bravely without such support. The Ethical Society rightly points to the saints of Buddhism and of Stoicism. But it is only where Christianity has spread abroad the idea of a ruling Providence that this moral cour-

age has been sufficient in quantity, and meek and gentle enough in quality to create the galaxies of martyrs, who have made civilization move forward by winning the admiration of the world. Surely, if we are tired of the dreary farce of appealing to reason in support of principles that destroy reason, we ought also to grow weary of appealing to ethics in behalf of a theory of the universe that makes all our instincts, our ethics, as well as our pieties, unmeaning. Let me sum up briefly:

1. The doctrine of Providence is implied in the idea of God as Creator, Preserver, and Ruler of the universe.

2. It is the teaching of the most gifted religious spirits, above all, of Jesus.

3. If our devotional instincts are trustworthy, and the spiritual values of loyalty, patience, faith, hope, contentment, resignation, humility are to be preserved, this doctrine must be retained.

4. Science has no voice in the matter, ignoring as it does, personality and limiting itself arbitrarily to layers and sections of reality.

5. Philosophy finds such views agreeable to its teaching about the relation of man to God and of God to man and the world.

6. It is no more overthrown by the presence of sin in the world than the proof of the existence of God is overthrown by sin.

7. It is not a view demonstrable by logic, but it is a view called for by the totality of our powers, a view whose acceptance calls for a certain amount of moral adventure, so to speak, for a determination of the soul to trust its instincts, and rise above the limitations of mere logic, a decision that is vindicated by its fruitful results in life and character.

CHAPTER VII

MIRACLES

The question confronts the religious world to-day whether miracles are any longer credible in the light of modern philosophy and modern science. The fundamental conviction of most so-called Modernists is that miracles are unbelievable. The radical Modernists assert this frankly, while the conservative Modernists avoid denial, but reveal their sympathy with it by attempting to state Christianity without any mention of the miraculous element that is so manifest in the New Testament, and in the historical faith, extolling the Sermon on the Mount and the character of Jesus, but ignoring His healings and the Resurrection appearances. We shall not see this Modernist movement in the right perspective unless we appreciate that it is largely a reaction against the theology of Transcendence, and is based on what is regarded as the opposite view, though it is properly the complementary view, of the Immanence of God.

When God was regarded as a transcendent Being, existing outside of His creation, miracles

were justified as necessary and reasonable credentials of His messengers. In the eighteenth century the Unitarians were at one with the Trinitarians in upholding them. God and Man being put so far apart, the credentials and not the contents of the message were given the chief attention. This Deistic view of the relation of God to His universe has now been overthrown, both by philosophy and religious experience.

We are convinced that creation is related as closely to God as thought is related to the thinker; that He is the supreme reality, in whom we live and move and have our being. Christian experience testifies that the truth has the power of awaking a response in the human heart, and evidencing itself. What need then, it is asked, is there of special miracles, when there is a light that lighteneth every man, and the spirit of man is the candle of the Lord, and the whole creation is a great miracle? So the evidence for miracles is abandoned for the evidence of the teaching, of the character of Jesus, and of the inner light. The appeal to miracles necessitated great emphasis upon the value of human testimony, and the function of the Church as an official witness. It exalted the letter of the Bible and the authority of the Church, whereas reliance on the self-evidencing power of the truth, or the indwelling spirit, frees us from these external guides.

The abandonment of the theory of God as exclusively Transcendent led to a great revival of spirituality, or perhaps I should put it the other way, and say that one of the causes of the abandonment of this conception of God as transcendent was the great quickening of vital piety in the Great Awakening. Certainly Deism and religious experience do not harmonize. The Mystic and the Pietist know that God is dealing with us.

One of the proofs of the inadequacy of the Deistic theory of God is the detriment that it wrought to religion. In truth, neither Transcendence or Immanence alone is a sufficient statement of the relation of God to His creation and the inadequacy of each statement shows itself not merely logically, but also in practical effects. The Transcendent God can support morality, but not piety, the Immanent God gives rationality to mysticism, but, unduly emphasized, becomes the God of Pantheism, and morality is destroyed.

The question inevitably arises, whether the modern emphasis on Immanence has not gone too far. Some people hold that it has not gone far enough, and that we need to draw out its implications if we are to have a truly reasonable Christianity. They are not satisfied to give the self-evidencing power of truth the first place in Christian evidences, and miracles a secondary place;

they hold that miracles must be dropped entirely as an obstacle to the progress of Christianity in an age of enlightenment. The claim is also made that a religion without miracle is more truly spiritual, and that Christian experience is in accord with reason in rejecting them. Certainly these claims need justification. Thus far the piety created by emphasis on God's Immanence seems lacking in some very vital elements of vigor. The Immanent God has a way of becoming pantheistically identified with the universe. If the religion of transcendence was a cold Deism, the religion of Immanence becomes a mystic Pantheism. Both experience and reason show that Pantheism obliterates moral distinctions, and destroys the personality of God, by which term I mean, that the Infinite has knowledge of itself and its activities and determines itself, and by lessening our conviction of God's personality weakens man's sense of responsibility. If God is a moral being, He must be free, since there is no room for morality in the realm of necessity, and if God is free He must have power over creation to work His will.

If God is a moral being, therefore, He must be transcendent as well as immanent. It follows from this that the obscuration of God's transcendence must have evil consequence in our century as certainly as the overlooking of His Imma-

nence led to evil consequences in the eighteenth century.

One manifest result is the denial of the possibility of miracle. If creation is the expression of the nature of God, as the Pantheist holds, then miracle is indeed inconceivable. God cannot alter His nature, which is the ground of all things, and which must be good. Miracle is as inconceivable in such a universe as perambulation in a tree; it is against the nature of things. But if God is in the universe as a thought is in the sentence, or as our personalities are in our bodies, expressed by the medium, yet over the medium and controlling it, then a miracle is a possibility, and our minds are open to consider the evidence.

Now I am persuaded that the God who is evidenced to us by all the departments of our nature, is the Transcendent-Immanent God, and that neither Deism nor Pantheism is adequate to give rationality to morality and religion, or to satisfy our intellectual and spiritual requirements. I cannot therefore accept the Pantheistic theory that miracles are incredible. I doubt whether a vital religion or sound morality can be nurtured by a philosophy that denies their possibility.

All the prophets magnify the power of God, and not His limitations, and invite men to make their wants fully known to Him, with the assurance that His power ruleth over all. How can this

living faith be kept alive, if God is identified with the All? It is not reasonable to trust Him for deliverance if He is imprisoned in the universe, and we are seeking a reasonable faith.

But neither should we run to the opposite extreme of superstition. We need evidence for miracles. The question therefore reduces itself into an inquiry whether the Historical Criticism of the Bible has left us any reliable evidence of miracles. It is undeniable that the evidence has greatly diminished. But in my judgment sufficient evidence of their occurrence remains. St. Paul's chief epistles are undoubtedly genuine. In them the Apostle clearly claims the power of working miracles and states that such gifts were possessed by the early Christians. The Resurrection appearances are difficult to reconcile in their details, but that is a common characteristic of all human testimony, and they agree on the main point, that Jesus appeared to His disciples after His sepulture. Only on the basis of such an appearance can I understand the change in the disciples, the conversion of St. Paul, and the exaltation of Him who is described in the early part of Acts as Thy servant Jesus, to the position of the Son of God in an eminent sense. A careful examination has convinced me that Luke, the companion of Paul, was the author of Acts and of the third Gospel. While some of the miracles

in the Gospels may have been enhanced, and others may have arisen by misconceptions of parables and the general tendency to magnify wonders, nevertheless it is incredible that the whole miraculous element is mythical and without historical foundation.

I should not take that position even about the Old Testament. Though unable to discern how much is mythical and how much historical, we are justified in holding that a people with such a marvelous sense of God's Providence as the Jews, must have had a unique Providential training. Their unique equipment must have been produced by unique leaders and unique experiences. So far as the Old Testament goes, the question may stand at that. But with reference to the New Testament, the evidence is far clearer and fuller. If we examine carefully the principles that guide many of the modern Higher Critics, we discern that they find no contemporaneous evidence of a miracle, for the very sufficient reason that if there is any evidence of a miracle, purporting to be contemporaneous, they immediately decide that the presence of the miracle in the narrative proves that the writer is neither contemporaneous nor trustworthy. Such is the method of Professor Kirsopp Lake. Of course no miracle can be proved by testimony, if the evidence is scrutinized in that spirit.

But what is the good of a miracle? Some critics, like Matthew Arnold, claim that a miracle is absolutely of no value; miracles, they assert, cannot prove the truth of the teaching of the miracle-worker. The objection has been much praised and exploited, but is academic, hypercritical and out of touch with the realities of life. An academic degree or a Copley medal do not prove the validity of its holder's theories; the ultimate proof of truth depends on reason. Nevertheless such attestations have value: they dispose people to consider in a confiding spirit the teaching of the holders of such credentials. They serve useful purposes. They are signs, and call for favorable attention. So miracles, or at least the claim to perform them, served a useful purpose in the early Church. In life imperfect views are often useful bridges to more adequate conceptions. As Theists, we appreciate that God's spirit uses these partial conceptions suitable to our infantile capacities, to lead us on to more manly views. The inspired prophet could convey a helpful message through the medium of a tribal conception of God, and an imperfect morality. If this be admitted with regard to the content of the message, it is only reasonable to hold that he would also adapt the credentials of the messenger to the primitive conceptions of the people to whom he was sent. The *a priori* probabilities

are all in favor of miracles in a Theistic view of the universe. The safest plan is to consider the evidence. The generalizing faculty must not be allowed to exclude experiences that do not suit it. If ants have this faculty, we may be sure that their systematizers scoff at the report of human interferences with ant-activities. Narrow dogmatism is out of place in this vast and mysterious universe. It is especially out of place and unjustifiable in humanistic philosophers who explain to us with such convincing power the large part that human "demands" and "claims" have in shaping our theories. Deep seated, indeed, is the longing for Divine intervention. *"Das Wunder ist des Glaubens liebstes Kind."* I am not willing to reject as irrational a belief so deep seated and wide-spread on the basis of a one-sided view of God's relation to His universe, especially when if the Immanence of God is an Immanence of will and intelligence and not an Immanence of a Being in Space and Time, there is no philosophical ground for such hostility to miracles. It is only when the Immanence of God is conceived of pantheistically that there is any philosophical difficulty.

A sound Theist cannot deny the possibility of miracles. This is Lotze's view. It would, of course, be a mistake to invoke ecclesiastical authority against the philosophical deniers of

miracles. When they are earnest seekers after truth, we ought to be willing to have the issue fought out inside the Church. This can safely be done as long as the Church's official testimony stands. Let us see what kind of religion will be nourished by a piety that emphasizes strongly the limitations of God. Perhaps the experience of Unitarianism in recent years and of rationalistic Germany is not conclusive. Certainly it has not been encouraging. Hitherto a Theism that binds God in the chains of necessity has not shown much potency in reclaiming the vicious and depraved. But the experiment is of great importance; let it be fully tried out. It is worth ascertaining whether the Immanence of God can be fruitfully stressed and realized, while this limitation on His power is insisted upon. I confess that I examine the evidence for every miracle with a conviction that the probabilities are strongly against each specific case. The New Testament miracles are more credible to me, not merely because they won assent while they were the credentials of an unpopular faith, but also because they appeared at a great crisis in the world's history, and served the great purpose of launching a lofty and spiritual faith. Belief in them is supported by the useful purpose they subserve. They are not arbitrary, but have a reasonable basis.

I see two great processes going on in the uni-

verse, moving in opposite directions. The material universe presents to the physicist and chemist the spectacle of a force exhausting itself. For example, the element now existing in our planet as lead was at one time uranium or thurium, elements with high radioactivity, but which gradually lost this potency. The process of degradation took millions of years, but the movement was all in one direction. The tendency is never reversed. To quote Wildon Carr, "Everywhere in the material universe, we see only force running down. We have no indication in our whole outlook on the material universe of a reverse movement." The present habitable condition of our planet depends on Solar radiation, and the sun is burning out, the tides are checking slowly the earth's rotation on its axis, the air is being exhausted, the water is being locked up in rocks and vegetation. Our planet is on its way to the status of the desolate moon. Our solar system is burning out and running down.

> Now side by side with this downward movement I see an ascent. It begins with life—a mysterious agency that physics and chemistry cannot explain, that mysteriously, I might say miraculously, appears in this earth and uses its stored energies. It is not matter, and does not create matter. To comprehend it we must study it as a spiritual,

i.e., as a non-material agency. It is active and purposive. It climbs into higher and higher forms till it reaches its culmination in man. It is a continuous creation.

With man, a new agent, appeared self-consciousness, reason, and we enter on a new ascent. Ethically and spiritually when Jesus of Nazareth appeared in the fullness of time, after Jewish history, Greek culture and philosophy, and Roman rule had prepared the way, another upward climb began. Divine intervention at this creative crisis to assist the pioneers to voice their creed before it was "echoed back by the crowd," or "won consecration from time" finds a *nodus dignus Deo vindice,* a crisis worthy of special Divine manifestation. Some people disbelieve in miracles on the ground that the need created the myth. But it is no valid reason for disbelieving an occurrence because it meets a great need. William James is fond of quoting a philosopher who held that life has a game flavor of adventure. To most of us the universe smacks strongly of purpose and design. That miracle shows a rational purpose is no reason for disbelieving the evidence. If God went beyond physical and chemical laws and introduced life on the planet, why is it incredible that He should have gone beyond the laws of physical life, and sent a unique messenger to the earth, like Jesus, and declared Him to be the Son

of God with power by the Resurrection from the dead? There is no sound *a priori* objection. To believers in Theism, there is a certain probability of such interventions on the part of a God of love.

Of course each several miracle must stand on its own evidence. For some of the New Testament miracles, and I am confining my attention to them, the testimony is clearly conflicting and unsatisfactory, but if we have any confidence in the Gospel narratives, the evidence is overwhelming that miracles accompanied the ministry of Jesus and his Apostles, and that Jesus manifested Himself to His disciples after the crucifixion. Certainly philosophy, that formerly was opposed to miracles, can no longer make any reasonable objection to them. Emergent Evolution is now the popular philosophy. The universe is now conceived of as a growing organism. Indeed the old view that causes must be adequate to the effect is derided, and Professor Lovejoy denies that the principle *e nihilo nihil fit* is fundamental.

Here is his exact language: "If we really know that absolute and general emergence is not possible, we know something very curious and important." He holds that the facts of life show "in our universe substantial increments popped into existence." Mechanistic science opposed this and so did theology—thinking that a God must have created them, but the Emergent Evolutionists

hold that without concerning ourselves with this theological assumption, "we have abundant reason to believe that there have occurred genuine new births of time, a sheer increase and diversification and enrichment of the sum of things here."

Theistic thinkers have always held that these mysterious increments were due to a Divine Artist working out His designs, and were no more explainable by natural causes than the beauty and message of a picture is explainable in terms of paint and brushes. This explanation Professor Lovejoy waves aside, he cannot accept it. Yet he gives it this remarkable support: he admits that the paint and brush do not produce the picture. His theory is that the picture emerges; it is a growing organism. Anyone who believes in a miracle like that has no right to object to Christian miracles on philosophical grounds. Any extraordinary occurrences are credible in such a universe. Emergent Evolution admits that the new, the unexpected, the uncaused, may happen. The new philosophy certainly opens a wide door for miracles.

But how about the new science? Can those who are familiar with its careful methods of induction and its search for facts, accept such a belief? I need not repeat the old argument that as the physicist disregards life, and the physiolo-

gist the mental phenomena, so science in its search for uniformities and generalism ignores personality, and is unqualified to deal with the side of man's life which belongs to realm of ends, and not to the realm of causation. I pass over the limitations of the field and method of science. My chief reason for disregarding the opposition of science is the unwillingness of scientific people to consider the evidence. Convinced that the universe is profoundly mysterious, as well as profoundly reasonable, and that the right use of reason is to examine this mystery, I am shocked by the narrow dogmatism of the average scientist on the subject of the miraculous, or the psychic. What weight is to be attached to the denial of Christian miracles by such men, when they are not willing to consider the evidence for psychic phenomena? Professor Broad has well said in *Contemporary British Philosophy:*

> A great deal of so-called skepticism is simply a particular kind of dogmatism which leads men to reject all alleged facts which do not come within the sphere of recognized science. . . . I have always been interested in the phenomena dealt with by Psychical Research and the attitude of orthodox scientists toward them has always seemed to me ridiculous. This view has been strengthened by subsequent intercourse with the skeletons

which inductive logic conceals in its cupboards. Thus my skepticism makes me less ready to reject the abnormal than most educated men of our time. A man must know a great deal more about the secrets of nature than I do to reject any alleged fact without investigation, however wild it may seem."

But that is just the way that Tyndall and Huxley treated the psychic phenomena they were asked to investigate. They refused to look into them. Everyone knows that when Alfred Russell Wallace, Crookes, Sir Oliver Lodge, Lord Rayleigh examined these facts they felt that they were not impostures but extraordinary phenomena calling for patient study and for new theories. When Professor Dresch of Leipzig can wind up his paper on Emergent Evolution at the Cambridge International Congress of Philosophy with the statement that "Psychical Research, I am convinced, will give us more important results than we are at the present time able to imagine," I feel that the day has passed when the phenomena of telepathy, phantasms and messages from the dead can be neglected.

This conviction is still further deepened when a justice in such a tribunal as the Supreme Court of the United States refers in a recent opinion to the necessity of preserving the sanctity of personal privacy from public espionage, and speaks

of the possibility of new invasions on our privacy through telepathy and the developments in the psychic field. The attitude of orthodox science to such investigations is blank skepticism and narrow dogmatism, with scorn and obloquy for the investigators. Crookes and Lodge were too great to be silenced, but their testimony is discredited. Science in this attitude has fallen short of its once high standard of open-mindedness.

I do not believe that anyone can examine with an open mind the records of Psychic Research without coming to the conclusion that a new class of phenomena has been discovered, and new forces that do not fall into the categories hitherto recognized. Such books as F. W. H. Myers's *Personality,* Crookes's account of his experiments with Home, and with Katie, the investigations of the London Society, Lord Dunraven's account of his observations of Home, Frederick Bligh Bond's history of his discovery of hitherto unknown chapels of Glastonbury Abbey, through following the guidance supplied by automatic writing, the writings of Sir Oliver Lodge and Sir William Barrett, and the monumental summary of Richet's *Thirty Years of Psychical Research,* supply a body of evidence that ought to put an end to dogmatic skepticism, and open the minds of people to more spiritual conceptions of the universe.

I admit freely that these new phenomena have broken down my own skepticism. They have delivered me from my former subjugation to the scientists. I realize that on this subject they are narrow dogmaticians. When a scientist, like the great Philadelphia chemist Hare was led by his scientific investigations to spiritualistic conclusions, that development of his teaching is ignored, and that final conclusion of his investigations is retired into the background. Such unfairness has weakened the force of the scientist's objections. Psychic research in short has made the New Testament miracles more credible. Moreover, while I cannot accept the dogmas of Christian Science, which seem to me based upon a misunderstanding of the philosophy of idealism and a mistaken exegesis of Scripture, still the extraordinary efficacy of its teachings has convinced me that it contains some element of truth, and that the mind has greater power over the body than orthodox science has admitted. Dr. Worcester has shown that religious truth has healing power. These healings have made the miracles of the Bible more credible. Christian healings and Psychic research have, in short, made the old scientific objections to miracle quite out of date.

But what shall be said to the Mystic objection, that in attaching importance to miracles, emphasis is placed on an element of Christianity which

does not evidence itself and when the historical rather than the spiritual is made important, man is made dependent upon experts, either ecclesiastical or professional, and we take the road back to our old dungeons? I answer that the evidence lies in many fields. Some are more important than others. The inner witness has an eminent place. But if we are to avoid fanaticism and delusions the evidence must be collected from all the fields and compared and sifted. Mysticism must not crowd out rationality. Neither may individualism safely ignore our position as members of an organism. Ethics and religion, like government and culture, are coöperative enterprises. A religion that derives nothing from others is a sickly, one-sided affair. A mysticism that cuts us loose from the past, and ignores its experiences and lessons condemns us to shallowness and ignorance. While it would be, indeed, a great injury to our freedom and independence if we were shut up exclusively to historical proofs, it is a great safeguard against ignorance and delusion to have the records of the past as a guide and check. It makes for sanity. It is in accord with our fundamental postulate that the totality of our nature is to be brought into contact with the totality of experience.

The great gain of believing that miracles have occurred consists in the spiritual view of the uni-

verse that such a historical belief entails. Of course this spiritual view of the universe may be held without accepting the historical testimony as sufficient. But, generally speaking, when the possibility is admitted the evidence is found satisfactory. And if the evidence for miracles is accepted, then history supports the teaching of a Theistic Philosophy, and God is neither an absentee governor, nor entombed in His own creation. He is ever living, ever working, ever guiding and molding His universe, the parts as well as the whole. Belief in miracles leads naturally to belief in Providence, though as Deism showed, they can be separated, and belief in Providence leads to ready acceptance of miracles on sufficient evidence. They are usually interdependent.

Whether the miraculous power that is in the New Testament continues in our own day is a question worth considering. It is usually held that one is incredible without the other. But this is not clear. History and science both show that there are critical stages in life. There are plastic stages when developments are possible, that afterwards become impossible. Clerk Maxwell, who is admitted to be one of the world's greatest scientific geniuses, held that there are "singular points where equations break down." At such singular points influences which are usually negligible assume a dominating importance.

Maxwell recognized that these singular points are sometimes points of growth. If frequent they would render science chaotic, or impossible, but occurring occasionally they are points of growth. Certainly the miracle of the Life and Resurrection of Jesus and the miraculous endowment fits in very well with this theory of Maxwell. One is not surprised that he was a sincere believer in Christianity.

But why may there not be later points of growth? Much may be said in favor of the constant activity of God to meet the needs of His children, and encourage them to turn unto Him for aid and guidance, with this limitation that a certain amount of regularity in nature is a rational necessity for the growth of knowledge and a moral necessity to insure the due rewards of prudence and morality and the evil effects of folly and sin. Not for slight causes will these sequences be interfered with. Reason justifies the lesson of experience that the Creator will influence nature as His children mold it by working through natural causes. How this may be done was brought home vividly to me by watching a haul of fishes at Atlantic City. A great net was drawn up at the end of a pier, and the spectators were interested in watching an unusually large and beautiful fish that was swimming frantically around, unable to break through at any point. The great net was

beneath, and its sides reached up high above the water all around. Escape seemed impossible when a strange event happened. The net was not broken, nor lowered, but the fish was seen outside. A great wave had swept in from the ocean and lifted the fish high over the net. The seemingly impossible had happened, without any violation of nature's law. It is the possibility that similar interferences may occur within the sequences of nature, that religion and philosophy are both interested in upholding. This theory connects our life with vaster potencies and recognizes that upon this bank and shoal of Time we are surrounded by an ocean of Infinity, out of which influences break upon our shores. It is not merely because we find miracle imbedded in Christianity that we accept the historical evidence. We also find the possibility of miracle a necessary implication of Christian Theism, and of a spiritual conception of man.

CHAPTER VIII

MYSTICISM [1]

MYSTICISM is to-day advocated as the sovereign cure for doubt, and the refreshing spring whose waters will renew the youthful vigor of faith. Baron von Hügel in the Church of Rome, Dean Inge in the Church of England, and Rufus Jones, Hocking, and Bennett in America, are only a few of the leaders of a host of writers who advocate its methods and maintain its great value, both for life and also for thought. Certainly it is an experience and method well worth the study of open-minded seekers after truth.

Of course there are many kinds of Mysticism. Some of its manifestations and types are clearly pathological, and have their origin in a deranged nervous system. Some are chiefly philosophical and based on an analysis of knowledge; the outgrowth of the conviction that the mind only knows sensations—a discovery that lies at the root of the entire philosophy and the Mysticism of India, a discovery which seems to have put an end to all further discoveries in that land.

[1] Reprinted, with permission, from *The Modern Churchman*, Vol. XVI, Nos. 9 and 10 (Dec. 1926 and Jan. 1927).

But the Mysticism which I have in mind in this paper is the religious Mysticism of the West, a Mysticism whose basis is not a philosophy, but an experience. The need that it supplies is not the desire for an explanation of the Kosmos, but the soul's yearning to come into contact with God. It is the Mysticism that Rufus Jones has so admirably treated in his *Studies in Mystical Religion;* the type of religion that puts the emphasis on immediate awareness of relation with God, on direct and intimate consciousness of the Divine Presence.

It is Mysticism of this character that the distinguished writers, to whom I have referred, are advocating as the true road to peace, and power, and the knowledge of God.

It will, perhaps, assist us to quiet the doubt about the validity of the mystical line of approach to a central problem of the religious life, the knowledge of God, a skepticism which will arise when we consider the delusions, fanaticisms and excesses for which mystical revelations have been alleged, if we bear in mind that the mystical method is not peculiar to religion, but is resorted to with admirable results in other fields. The method is, in truth, a psychological necessity, and an entirely normal process. It is a way of keeping in our consciousness the totality of things. It is the corrector of the limitations of the process of

the analytical intellect. For the method of the intellect is to divide in order to conquer. Its entire procedure is a tearing apart of the unity of things and arranging the conglomerate mass into strata and layers. It rends apart the seamless robe of reality and unravels its warp and woof. It is the mystery of mysteries that reality can be so successfully treated in this fashion. The Higher Reason, what the Germans call *die Vernunft,* from its central keep, watches the logical faculties at their work, and appreciates that it is a process of dissection, and realizes the danger that the life of the whole may be overlooked.

Our method is first to separate by a wide gulf the observer, the subject, and the things observed, the object. How philosophy has labored to pass over this great gulf! Then we divide the "object" up into various strata; first by eliminating every quality but the categories of number and quantity, we have mathematics; then by considering simply matter and motion, and the phenomena of inanimate matter outside the structure of the molecule, we build up a science of physics; chemistry limits itself to the forces within the molecule; botany, to the life of plants; zoölogy, to animals; physiology, to man's body; man's mental operations are studied in metaphysics, logic, and ethics; his institutions and his history are separate departments of knowledge. Marvelous

is the progress achieved in knowledge and in arts and industry by such processes of division, classification, and restriction of attention to separate fields. Innumerable are the sub-divisions into which each of these main divisions is divided.

But these divisions are clearly not reality itself. The philosopher and the artist, as well as the religious thinker, is keenly alive to the fact that in treating nature in this fashion we are using methods that blind us to the interpenetration, close association, general "dovetailedness" of things. The gain secured by the concentration of attention has a corresponding loss in the vision of the reality. This objective world, divided by the understanding into mathematics, physics, and so forth, is no more the world that we experience than the globe with its lines of longitude and latitude is the globe that the mariner sails over; it is a helpful presentation for speculative and practical purposes, but it is not the real thing, which is immeasurably vaster and more complex, and more indigestible (so to speak).

The success of this method is based upon the ignoring of innumerable qualities. To take one outstanding case, there is an entire loss of the category of beauty. The beauty of the flowers is a mere incident in the science of botany, but in our actual life it is their main significance or value.

Things in their beauty, and in their harmonious relations one to another, by the constitution of our minds, awaken in us a profound and mysterious emotional response. Our heart leaps up when we behold the rainbow in the sky, or the billowy plain of the ocean reaching to the horizon's rim, or snow-capped mountains, or vast assemblies of people, either in a hall, or in the ordered march of parade.

We appreciate instinctively that through the contemplation of things as they are in their totality, in their complexity and unity, we come in peculiarly close touch with reality, by an emotional response. "This is life," the beholder exclaims, as he sees the activities of the Chamber of Commerce, or the market-place, or the football match. "This is the real thing."

Here then, through our emotional response to the whole of things as they coexist in their undifferentiated entirety, we have a way of knowing reality that supplements the method of the analytical reason and restores to us the unity of nature, which the other process mutilates. The methods are supplemental, each to the other; it therefore follows that neither should be permitted to destroy the other. Certainly these emotional responses speak with the accent of authority. Science uses them in its realm, and is content to rest upon the testimony of the emotions that

sugar is sweet, musical notes accordant, and colors complementary one to the other. These are surely just as ultimate experiences as the conviction that an argument is sound because the logical understanding feels it to be so. It is basic that our emotional responses, our feelings, are one of the methods of coming into contact with reality.

This exaltation of feeling, from being merely a source of pleasure or pain into a channel of revelation and a means of knowledge, naturally makes the mystic attitude congenial to the artists in all their varied departments of literature, painting, and music. It also appeals to philosophers of a certain type in their efforts to unify all our experiences. There is, accordingly, an artistic Mysticism, and a philosophical Mysticism. Religious Mysticism is only a manifestation in the department of religion of a special method of coming into contact with reality.

It would be helpful to greater clearness of thought if the limiting adjective were always associated with the noun, and we should always speak of religious Mysticism, or philosophical Mysticism, or artistic Mysticism; such analysis, however, is contrary to the whole spirit of Mysticism, which avoids all clear analysis, as well of the subject as of the object of consciousness. The name

"Mysticism" without any qualification is used for this method of seeking to avoid the errors of analysis, by confronting the totality of things, and allowing the totality to make its impress upon our receptive consciousness.

Certainly religion, and the knowledge of God, which is the core of religion, is a most appropriate field for the method. If there is a God, He is the supreme reality, since in and by and for Him all things consist. The methods of analysis are certainly much restricted in dealing with a reality that is indiscerptible, that is everywhere in its potency. Since God is the supreme unity, there can be no surer way of coming into contact with things in their totality, than by coming into conscious relation with Him, who is the center and core of all things. This is the experience which the Mystics assert that they have had. They claim that they have become aware of Him; that He has dealt directly with them; that He is no longer to them a probable hypothesis, a logical deduction, an authoritative tradition that has proven helpful and fruitful in practice; He has become an experience, and has been realized as a presence.

Wordsworth reached this mystical sense of God through Nature. In his classical lines on Tintern Abbey, he tells us he felt:

A sense sublime
Of something far more deeply interfused,
Whose dwelling is the light of setting suns,
And the round ocean and the living air,
And the blue sky, and in the mind of man;
A motion and a spirit that impels
All thinking things, all objects of all thought,
And rolls through all things.

The religious Mystic is, however, usually brought to this mystic experience by communing with his own heart, and meditating upon his yearnings for a sustainer, companion, and illuminator. The contrast between his need and the power manifested in the universe usually produces the experience, which Coleridge admirably expressed when he wrote:

A sense o'er all my soul impressed
That I am weak, yet not unblessed,
Since in me, round me, everywhere
Eternal strength and goodness are.

The fundamental question, of course, is whether this experience is valid; whether it is a delusion, a hallucination, due to nervous defects, or whether it brings us authentic tidings of invisible things.

For my own part, I do not see how we can ascribe authority to the intuitions of artists, and, I might add, of scientists—for many of the greatest discoveries of science have been due to intui-

tions and mystical insights—and refuse validity to these intuitive responses to the nature of things, in the realm of religion, especially when the experience is undergone by minds that show themselves strong and well-balanced in other spheres, and proves fruitful in life.

Mark you, I say validity and not infallibility. I am not claiming that these experiences authenticate either the theology of the gifted soul that is blessed with them, or the interpretations that the subject puts upon them. These are the statements of the reason about those feelings, and not the feelings themselves. I am simply saying that the Mystic is entitled to be believed when he reports that someone touched him, that some breath was breathed upon him, that he was conscious of a Presence with him, that he had a real experience, and not an hallucination.

Certainly it is an experience that, as William James has pointed out, is always felt by the subject to validate itself, though the analytical reason can after a while explain it away as an hallucination, if the subject of it so desires, just as the analytical faculty can explain away ethical distinctions, or the reality of the external world, if negative conclusions are strongly desired either by passion, or deep weariness of life.

But really, the analytical reason is here not entitled to the final word. Like beauty and nobil-

ity, this is a question not of logic, but of susceptibility and experience. It belongs to another realm. For my part I accept it.

Certainly nothing could be sounder than the contention of Rufus Jones that this mystical element is manifest in the religion of Jesus, of Paul, and John. Jesus clearly felt Himself in communion with God, led by God, aware of the Father's will, blessed by the Father's love. Paul was convinced not merely that he had a vision of Christ on the road to Damascus, but that he had a vision of God in the face of Jesus Christ, and that he was so united with the God manifested to him by Christ and through Christ, that Christ might be said to dwell in him, and he in Christ.

Every student of church history will agree that the revival of the mystical experience was at various times a great quickener of the vitality of religion. In the early centuries through the Montanists, in the Middle Ages by St. Bernard, Francis of Assisi, the Brethren of the Common Life, and the classical Mystics of those times, Bonaventura, the Victors in France, and Suso, Eckhart and Ruysbroeck in Teutondom, among the Moravians and the Friends of the Protestant world, and in St. Theresa, Madame Guyon, Fénelon of the post-Reformation Catholic world.

There is on all hands among historians and

philosophers a strong conviction that a revival to-day of Mysticism contains a promise of good things. The psychologists point out, with great force, as Bennett has shown in his *Philosophical Study of Mysticism,* that such a reaction in favor of Mysticism after the strenuous intellectualism of over a century is in accordance with a great instinct of our nature, whereby we seek, automatically, to maintain the balance of the mind, as well as the balance of the body. It is more, therefore, than a movement of thought, it is a movement of life, seeking to exercise all its functions.

Most heartily do I accept and endorse such teaching, with this important qualification, namely, that the mystical method of approach to God and reality is only one of several methods, and that it can only be kept sane and helpful if the other methods are united with it, just as these other methods are deprived of much of their efficacy if they choke up Mysticism's "bubbling springs that feed the world." For if there has been a barren and heartless intellectualism in religion, or a blind will-worship, a mere obedient submission to authority, and a mere practice of morality or rites and ceremonies, when Mysticism has been crowded out, so there have been wild delusions of Mystics, consecration of superstitions by ecstatic visions, and a complete

separation of religion from the teachings of history and the claims of morality, when the understanding has been ignored. As Pfleiderer has well said, the history of the religions of India constitutes the final judgment upon Mysticism unrestrained and uncorrected.

The reason of the failure is most apparent. Is it not obvious that we have no right to neglect any part of our nature, and in our effort to come into touch with reality and with Him who is the supreme reality, that we must confront the totality of things with the totality of our nature?

We do not consist merely of emotions. We have also an intellect and a will, to adopt the old convenient classification. We think, and will, as well as feel, to put it in more modern fashion.

Mysticism, that is so absorbed in the unity of all things in God, destroys the unity of man when it disparages, as it often does, the testimony of the intellect and will. For it must be emphasized that feeling is not our only point of contact with reality. Through feeling the poet may realize the beauty of the tree:

> I think that I shall never see
> A poem lovely as a tree—
> A tree whose hungry roots are pressed
> Upon the earth's sweet flowing breast;
> A tree that looks on God all day,
> And lifts its leafy arms to pray;

A tree that may in summer wear
A nest of robins in its hair.
Upon whose bosom snow has lain,
Who intimately lives with rain.
Poems are made by fools like me,
But only God can make a tree.

But reason also tells us other important truths about the tree, such as its history and growth, its relation to other trees, to animals, and to man's purposes. That poem does not make botany superfluous. I shall learn still more about a tree if I try to climb it, or to cut it down, or to make it bear fruit by digging about it and spraying it.

How little we should know about steam if we were content only with feeling its heat and force and did not study its origin and changes; and how much more fruitful our study has been made by our discoveries through using it.

The same principle holds good in realizing the Supreme Reality—God. It is surely not enough to feel Him in a mystic experience, as a great sustaining Power, on whom we depend, nearer than breathing, closer than hands or feet. Our intellect must inquire whether He has not sent into the world great religious geniuses, to help us to apprehend Him, as He has granted us great geniuses to teach and lead us in the arts, in government, in science, and in morals. Our will must find out by seeking to do His will, how fruitful it

is of inward strength and of helpful solutions. Our analytical faculties must be encouraged in these explorations. Let them dig a little deeper, and see whether they will not find God there; God, implied in our premises, as well as God at the end of our arguments; God everywhere.

Let mind take the wings of the morning, the glass of the telescope, the lenses of the microscope, the most delicate conceivable instruments, let it travel to the uttermost parts of the universe, what can its report be, but even there it finds Him. "Earth with all her myriad voices praises God," exclaims Coleridge in his hymn to Mont Blanc. Is it not true that all the departments of our nature similarly testify to God? Surely this acceptance of the testimony of all departments or faculties of our nature is a marked characteristic of the religion of the New Testament. In addition to its mystical element it also has a reasonable element and a practical element and a pronounced ethical element, and an element of organization and worship.

It commands us to love God with our mind, and with our strength or will, as well as with our heart, or emotional nature. It appeals to the reasonable testimony of eye-witnesses for its facts, speaks of what eyes have seen, and hands handled, refers to ancient writers, and to practical tests of fruits, and relies on organization and argument

as well as the mystical response for the extension of the Kingdom of God.

I welcome the appeal to the Christianity of the New Testament, because besides its mystical quality, it has also intellectual and institutional elements. It seems to me that the ineffectiveness of Quakerism, in spite of its important contribution to Christendom, is due to the neglect of these other features of primitive Christianity, of these other methods of coming in contact with God.

I hope that the present revival of Mysticism will not fall into this error. I confess that I see many signs of its recurrence. It is the special duty of Modernists, the inheritors of the great tradition that right reason is a road to God, to utter warnings against this one-sidedness.

Experience has shown that that potted extract of man, known as a "reasonable person," is not the proper measure of all experience. The Mystic, the Pragmatist, the Humanist has done great service in pointing out the richness of man's nature and the manifoldness of his endowments. The revolt against excessive intellectualism has been justified. But it is not necessary or wise to swing to the other extreme, and reduce man to a mass of emotions, or if reason is recognized, to place it in a subordinate place and give emotion the helm. The rich variety of our endowments cannot safely be ignored in this way, nor can the

sovereign right of reason to preside over our entire nature and harmonize all our faculties be wisely relinquished to the emotions!

Yet this is exactly what the Mystics are prone to do. They persist in claiming that their type of religion is the only *vital* religion, and their proof of the existence of God is the only *valid* proof. For example, Professor Hocking disparages all the arguments for the existence of God except the ontological argument which is based upon a mystic feeling of His reality. All the other lines of proof are of no value in his judgment, since they do not awake the Mystic response, but only prove an artificer and sustainer of the universe, and not the Absolute; in the opinion of Mystics they are of no religious value. Surely this is a very dangerous way in which to defend religion. Ninety-nine men out of a hundred do not feel any force in the ontological argument. Many people leading consistent Christian lives have never had any vivid mystical experience. Rufus Jones correctly argues that there is an element of intellect in the mystical vision, though it is subordinate; it may be claimed with equal truth that there is an element of the mystical response in the feeling of satisfaction that Theism gives; that there is a mystic response in the *satisfactoriness* of the Christian solution of our religious and moral problems. The element is latent,

and not predominant, as in the conscious mystic experience.

To tell people that the arguments they rely on to justify their belief in God are worthless and to denominate their piety as not vital because this mystical element is latent and not predominant, sounds very arrogant. This, indeed, is a fault to which Mystics are very prone. I believe that such assertions are unwarranted. I hold that those arguments for the existence of God so derided by the Mystics—the cosmological, the teleological, the argument from the moral government to a moral governor, have value, each in its degree, and together possess an overwhelming power. I am convinced that the arguments of Balfour's great Gifford Lectures are sound, and that belief in God is the only rational justification of our æsthetics, ethics, and our confidence in the operation of our own reason. I admit there is a peculiar beauty about the mystic piety. The Mystic is one who has been taken into the Father's intimacy. But surely he also is a true son, who accepts the Father's will and walks by faith, without the vision. At one time John Wesley argued that there was no conversion without the mystic response in the consciousness of forgiveness, but toward the end of his life he repudiated such one-sidedness, and said that he wondered that people did not stone him when he made such assertions.

As for the Mystic exaltation of the Absolute, I can only say with Mr. Balfour, that I have never been able to fuse the metaphysical conception of God as the Absolute, an Identity wherein all differences vanish, or a Unity which includes but does not transcend the differences which it somehow holds in solution, with the God of religion, a God whom men can love, a God to whom men can pray, who takes sides, who has purpose and preferences, whose attributes, howsoever conceived, leave unimpaired the possibility of a personal relation between Himself and those whom He has created.

I feel that there is truth in both conceptions, both lines of approach; I wish that I could harmonize them, but if I must abandon one, it will not be the latter, which makes much the stronger and more universal appeal. Such a God satisfies the needs of our will and our conscience. Our unity with Him is a union of personalities and of moral purpose, whereas the mystic union is too often a pantheistic absorption.

After all, religion is with most of us, and for all of us, I take it, most of the time, a matter of faith and not of vision.

Manifest are the defects of an exaggerated Mysticism, the delusion of the feelings unguided by the intellect, or by practical experience. It is the mystical element in Evangelicalism that is to

blame for the intellectual laziness of that school. Sometimes Mysticism wages war upon ecclesiasticism, and treats the Church as an impertinence, and history as an allegory. But often it takes another turn, and consecrates all the dogmas or institutions that lie in the mind of the subject of the experience, at the time of his ecstatic rapture. In truth Mysticism lays special snares for the feet of the lazy and the timid, and has contributed very little directly to the increase of religious knowledge, as Pfleiderer has well pointed out. It has been a great teacher of compromise. Men of one-sided emotional nature shrink from any open conflict with the authorities of the prevailing religious system. Content to dwell in the realm of emotion, they shrink from seeking to evaluate emotions, from drawing out their implications, from checking them up. Whatever gives an emotional thrill Mysticism is apt to accept, whether crude dogmas or superstitious practices.

Sometimes the Mystics accept the theory that one form is as good as another, and that if we get the response, we need not ask what the intellect may say. So Keyserling, in his laudation of Indian Mysticism, reports with approval the conduct of an Indian astronomer, who would calculate an eclipse mathematically, and then, on its occurrence, beat a gong to drive the evil spirits away. "Quite right," comments Keyserling,

"mystically, religiously correct." It seems to me that some Modernists are in danger of following the same line of reasoning, when they use because of its emotional value a ritual that symbolizes a theology they have abandoned. Certainly such a procedure does not unify our nature, one of the chief aims of religion.

But I must not dwell longer on the dangers of Mysticism when it is dominant and removes reason from its proper throne. I emphasize it here, for this warning is one of the chief contributions that Modernism has to make to Mysticism. It supplies it with correctives and helps, and draws out into clear consciousness the implications of its emotions. No school has so much to confer upon the Mystics. They supplement one another. Of course, it follows from this, that no school stands more in need of mystical experience. An intellectual Modernism that despises religious experience is in an evil case.

The remedy is to refresh the springs of thought and feeling by waiting upon God, in the cultivation of a wise passiveness, in refreshing the heart with beauty, in communing with the still small voice of conscience, in sitting at the feet of the great Mystics, in walking with Him who, on the road to Emmaus, made the hearts of the disciples glow as he opened unto them the Scriptures. This

is what we have too often left undone; we need more mystical experience.

Of course it does not follow that we must therefore disparage the intellect and will as sources of knowledge and fields of service. As the ship makes its way through the seas by a combination of the forces of the sail and the rudder, so we shall pursue the right course if we bring our whole nature, and all its faculties, to God. He has not left Himself without witness in our nature, neither in heart, nor mind, nor will. Alone none of them can find Him. The Mystic of India either cries out that all is illusion, or smothers himself and God in the All. The intellect unaided by other faculties will either make God Unknowable, or the Absolute. The will will treat Him either as a working theory, or a tradition, or a blind force. Conjoined together they will bring us to Theism, to the God and Father of our Lord and Savior, Jesus Christ. Surely this is the teaching of experience, as well as of reason.

The practical lesson is plain: What God has joined together, let not men put asunder. We must face the totality of reality with the totality of our faculties.

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